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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(Supp. 1989), by virtue of the Order of the
Supreme Court, dated February 22, 1989, pouring-over this case.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Aetna has identified the issues it has chosen to appeal at
pages 3-4 of its Brief.

Home has briefed the issues raised by

Aetna (see Argument, supra).

At this point, Home notes only

that it does not necessarily accept the categorization scheme
offered by Aetna, in terms of what the effect would be of a
resolution of any of the issues in Aetna's favor.

Home's

analysis in this regard is subsumed within the Argument which
follows.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Aetna identifies former Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (since
repealed) as one "whose interpretation is determinative."

As

Home notes in point III herein, this statute need not be
addressed at all to affirm the Court's handling of jury special
interrogatories nos. 2 and 4.

Also, Home and Aetna disagree on

whether the statute applies where there was no
tfcisrepreservtatiorv or oavLssiotv of a material fact by Rofl\e,
intentional or unintentional, in response to any inquiry in the
Application it completed for the Aetna Bond.

- 1 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.
This is an action on a contract of insurance brought by

Home Savings & Loan against the Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company.

By this action# Home seeks indemnification for losses

caused by the dishonest conduct of one of its employees, Larry
Glad# which it sustained and discovered during the period a
Savings & Loan Blanket Bond issued by Aetna was in effect.
Home also seeks indemnification for attorneys fees incurred by
it in defending the lawsuit which gave rise to the losses it
sustained.
Home sustained its losses when the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, in Armitaae v. Home Savings &
Loan, Civil No. C82-0670K (Kane, J.) voided the notes and trust
deeds of 36 husband and wife borrowers who had borrowed money
from Home to invest in AFCO/ a Utah corporate enterprise headed
by Grant Affleck.

The Armitaae jury returned a verdict adverse

to Home Savings on August 14, 1984.

Based on the verdict/ the

Armitaae Court on February 24/ 1986 entered judgment formally
voiding the plaintiffs' notes and trust deeds.

The principal

on the 36 notes voided by the Armitaae Court totaled
approximately $1.2 million/ which/ after certain setoffs
ordered by the Court/ resulted in a loss to Home of
approximately $998/000.

In addition, the Court ordered Home to

pay the Armitage plaintiffs $381/294.62 in attorneys fees and
- 2 -

costs they had incurred, which sum was later compromised in
settlement to $190,647.31.
II.

Procedural History and Trial Court Disposition,
Home Savings filed its complaint against Aetna in March,

1986.

The case was tried to a jury over a five-week period in

October - November 1987, which culminated in the jury, on
November 24, 1987, issuing a Special Verdict and responding to
certain separate Special Interrogatories.

In a series of

hearings over the next twelve months, the Court ruled on the
effect of the jury's response to special interrogatories and
resolved various issues which the parties had reserved for
determination by the Court.

Judgment was finally entered in

favor of Home on November 2, 1988, in the amount of
$1,983,756.12.
In the months preceding trial, Aetna brought several
motions seeking dismissal of Home's complaint.

The first was a

motion to dismiss for failure to join an allegedly
indispensable party, F&D of Maryland, which had issued fidelity
Bond coverage to Home prior to Home's purchase of the Aetna
Bond in June, 1982.
motion.

Aetna appeals from the denial of that

(Aetna Brief, Point VI).

Next, Aetna tried three motions for summary judgment.
Aetna argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of
- 3 -

law because:

(1) its Bond did not indemnify Home's loss

because Home, allegedly, had somehow discovered its "loss"
before the Aetna Bond went into effect on June 21, 1982 (though
the Armitage judgment would not be entered until 3-1/2 years
later); (2) its Bond excluded from coverage "any loss resulting
directly or indirectly from trading" (Rider 6030a); and (3)
Home allegedly failed to mitigate its damages,

Aetna appeals

the Trial Court's denial of its first and second motions for
summary judgment,

(Aetna Brief, Points II and IV).

At the same time Aetna moved for summary judgment, Home
sought a determination that, consistent with the
indemnification language in Aetna's Bond, Home both "sustained"
and "discovered" its loss on the AFCO-investor loans during the
time period the Aetna Bond was in effect.

The Trial Court

issued an Order construing the Bond, in which it concluded that
Home's "loss" was sustained and discovered when the Armitaae
Court avoided the AFCO-investors' notes and trust deeds (R.
385).

The Order thus established that Home "discovered its

'loss sustained' during the period the Aetna Bond was in
effect."

The Order, however, left two key factual questions

for the jury to decide:

(1) "Was Larry Glad's conduct

dishonest?" and (2) "If Glad's conduct was dishonest, did it
cause Home to sustain its losses on the AFCO-investor loans?"
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By the time of trial, Aetna had abandoned its "trading
exclusion" defense.

(See Pretrial Order, R. 719). Aetna

defended on several remaining bases.

Principally/ it argued:

(1) that Home had not proven that Glad was dishonest; (2) that
Home's losses were caused not by Larry Glad/ but were caused by
Home's mismanagement and bad business judgment; (3) that Home
had failed to mitigate its losses; (4) that Home had failed to
timely notify Aetna of a loss or potential loss caused by
dishonesty, in accordance with the Bond's notice provisions;
(5) that coverage for loss caused by Glad's dishonest conduct
was excluded by Section 11 of its Bond/ which terminates
coverage for loss caused by an employee who continues in the
insured's employment after the insured discovers he is
dishonest (Aetna Brief/ Point I); and (6) its Bond was void ab
initio because Home had either intentionally or unintentionally
failed to disclose to Aetna facts and information material to
the risk it insured/ in connection with the Application Home
completed when it purchased the Bond (Aetna Brief/ Point III).
At trial/ Aetna's "everything including the kitchen sink"
defense not infrequently witnessed Aetna arguing intrinsically
contradictory positions.

Closing argument/ for instance, found

Aetna defending Larry Glad's integrity and arguing that Home
had not proven he was dishonest (R. 2917.150-.180/ -.196-.197);
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while simultaneously urging that the evidence of Glad's
dishonesty was so pervasive that Home should have known better
than to have hired him in the first place (R. 2917,213-.215).
It found Aetna contending that Glad had been the only one at
Home Savings "trying to do the right thing" (R. 2917.152,-.153,
-.154); even though it was Aetna which called Ron Carnago, who
testified that Glad had earlier embezzled $60,000 from Sandy
State Bank while in its employ (R. 2910.197-.224; Trial Exh.
366), and Sandy State's Clea Rasmussen, who branded Glad "an
habitual liar," though a "very" good and "convincing" one.

(R.

2923.18).
Because Aetna failed to prove any prejudice, the Trial
Court disposed of Aetna's "timely notice" issue in the process
of instructing the jury.
35, R. 1337).
"notice."

(R. 2923.218-.220; Instruction no.

Aetna has not appealed the Court's ruling on

Aetna has, however, appealed the Court's decision to

give certain other instructions, as well as its refusal to give
two instructions which Aetna proposed.

(Aetna Brief, Point V ) .

The Trial Court submitted to the jury a Special Verdict.
(R. 1347).

It also drafted and separately submitted Special

Interrogatories, keyed to Aetna's equitable "Bond void ab
initio" defense and its "Section 11" defense (R. 1351), the
responses to which the Court indicated would be evaluated and
"sorted through" following trial.
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On Thanksgiving eve, 1987,

the jury returned its Special Verdict and answered the Special
Interrogatories.

The jury, in its Special Verdict, found (1)

that Glad's conduct, while in Home's employment, was dishonest
and (2) that Glad's dishonest conduct had caused certain of the
losses Home had sustained in connection with the AFCO-investor
loans.

It then found that Home's losses on 34 of the 36

AFCO-investor loans had been caused by Glad's dishonest
conduct.

It also found that Home had not failed to mitigate

its losses.
Responding to Special Interrogatories nos. 1-4, the jury
concluded there was no intentional omission or nondisclosure by
Home of information material to the risk Aetna had insured, in
response to inquiries made by Aetna in the Application for the
Bond which Home completed, or otherwise.

However, the jury

advised the Trial Court that Home had unintentionally failed to
diclose material information in response to, and aside from,
inquiries made by Aetna in the Application.

The jury's answers

to the final four interrogatories established that someone at
Home had discovered an act of dishonesty by Larry Glad "about
mid-December 1981", unrelated to the AFCO-investor loans; and
that Home had not known that Glad had engaged in dishonest
conduct at other institutions prior to the time Home hired him.
Aetna brought the first in a series of post-trial motions,
entitled "motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict."
- 7 -

In

it/ Aetna again contended that there was no evidence at trial
which established that Glad was dishonest and there was no
evidence that Glad's dishonest conduct caused Home's losses.
The Court denied Aetna's motion/ finding that there was
substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's
verdict.

(R. 1498/ 2918.48-.49).

The Trial Court and the parties next proceeded to examine
the impact of the jury's special interrogatory responses on the
special verdict.

In a lengthy Memorandum Decision issued March

4/ 1988 (R. 2058)/ the Court found no evidence in the record to
support the jury's conclusion that Home had unintentionally
failed to disclose information material- to the risk, in
response to any inquiries made by Aetna in the Application it
asked Home to complete.

Accordingly/ the Court chose to

disregard the jury's answer to interrogatory no. 2.

The Court

found that evidence existed in the record to support the jury's
answer to interrogatory no. 4, but concluded that an insured
has no legal duty to volunteer facts or information about which
an insurer makes no inquiry.

The Court also concluded that the

jury's responses to interrogatories nos. 5-8 provided no basis
for denying coverage for Home's losses.

The Court ruled that

judgment would be entered in Home's favor/ pending resolution
of remaining issues that the parties had reserved for
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determination by the Court, which would establish the amount of
the judgment.
All but one of the remaining issues were resolved by Minute
Entries of April 11 and May 10, 1988 (R. 2212, 2397).

Aetna

appeals two of the issues resolved by the second Minute Entry:
(1) Home's claim for the attorneys fees it paid to the Armitage
plaintiffs (Aetna Brief, Point VIII-A); and (2) Aetna's claim,
first raised after trial, that Home's "profits" on the AFCO and
AFCO-investor loans should be set off against its losses (Aetna
Brief, Point VII).
The remaining issue was Home's claim of indemnification for
fees and costs it paid to its attorneys in defending the
Armitage litigation.

Following a short period which the Court

allowed for supplemental discovery into "reasonableness" of
fees, Home, in October, 1988, moved for partial summary
judgment on the fees issue.
it paid in fees.

Home sought the full $474,170.57

Rather than contest Home's Motion, Aetna

stipulated that the reasonable fees to which Home was entitled
were $437,500.00.

Despite its Stipulation to the contrary,

Aetna now appeals this issue as well.
VIII-B).
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(Aetna Brief, Point

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

Home's acquisition of the Aetna Bond.
1.

Federal and State regulatory law in effect during the

time period of this lawsuit required Home to have in place
fidelity loss coverage, in the form of a standard Savings &
Loan Blanket Bond.

(Shaw, R. 2916*204; Bradshaw, R.

2906.16-.22) .
2.

From June 21, 1979 to June 21, 1982, Home was

protected against loss caused by dishonesty of any of its
employees by a Form 22 Savings & Loan Blanket Bond issued by
F&D of Maryland.
3.

(R. 3414-3432).

In mid-May, 1982, Don Bradshaw, in an effort to

solicit Home's business, wrote Home and asked if he could quote
Home a rate on a Blanket Bond, to be issued by The Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.

(Trial Exh. 117; R. 2906.6-.il).

Bradshaw was an independent insurance agent with authority to
sell insurance on behalf of Aetna, F&D of Maryland, and various
other companies.

(R. 2906.1-.4).

Bradshaw was aware that the

F&D Bond's anniversary date was June 21, 1982 (R. 2906.7) and
that Home could automatically renew the F&D Bond (R. 2906.23).
4.
Bond.

Bradshaw had authority to write a renewal of the F&D
(R. 2906.11-.12).

However, he recommended that Home

switch its Bond coverage to Aetna because (1) he thought
Aetna's premiums were more competitive and (2) it would spare
- 10 -

him the personal hassle of going through "an agent of record
process/1 required to renew the F&D Bond through him.

(R.

2906.12-.14) .
5.

On June 16, 1982, Home, through Bradshaw, applied for

an Aetna Bond, requesting coverage in the amount of $900,000,
the same amount of coverage it had with F&D of Maryland.
(Bradshaw, R. 2906.16-.17,-.22; Trial Exh. 118, 122).
6.

The Aetna Application form, at Question 17, asked Home

to, "List on page 4 all losses sustained by date, type and
amount, whether reimbursed or not, during the last six years.
If none, so state."

Home truthfully answered, "None over

deductible amount."

(Trial Exh. 122).

7.

The Application did not ask lor any of the information

marshalled by Aetna in its Brief which Aetna now claims should
have been disclosed.

(Compare Trial Exh. 122 to summary of

Robinson and Bradshaw testimony, Aetna Brief, p. 47).
8.

During a routine Federal Home Loan Bank Examination

begun June 4, 1982, examiners instructed Home to increase its
Blanket Bond coverage to $1,135 million (Bradshaw, R. 2906.18),
consistent with government regulatory formulas (Smolka, R.
2919.79-.80; Bradshaw, R. 2906.17).
for increased coverage to Aetna.
9.

Home forwarded a request

(Trial Exh. 334).

Aetna was not able to process Home's Application by

June 21 (Bradshaw, R. 2906.10), but issued its Bond in July,
backdated to June 21, 1982 (R. 2906.14).
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II.

The Aetna Bond.
10.

The Aetna Bond (Trial Exh. 343) was issued effective

June 21, 1982, in the face amount of $1,135 million, for a
three year term.
11•

The "Preamble" language of Aetna's Bond (p. 2, 1f 1 ) ,

which applies to all the Bond's insuring agreements, obligates
Aetna to indemnify Home for "loss sustained by [Home] at any
time but discovered during the Bond Period."
12.

Rider 6041, which replaces Insuring Agreement (A) in

the text of the Bond, prescribes fidelity coverage.

It

provides that Aetna will indemnify, "Loss resulting directly
from one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee,
committed anywhere and whether committed alone or in collusion
with others. . . . "

"Dishonest or fraudulent acts" is defined

as "acts committed by the Employee with the manifest intent:
(a) to cause the insured to sustain such loss; and (b) to
obtain financial benefit for the Employee, or for any other
person or organization intended by the Employee to receive such
benefit
13.

..."
General Agreement C provides that Aetna will indemnify

Home for court costs and attorneys fees "incurred and paid" in
defending any lawsuit in which the claims, "if established
against the Insured, would constitute a valid and collectible
- 12 -

loss sustained by the Insured under the terms of this Bond."
The costs/attorneys fees indemnity is in addition to the face
amount of the Bond.

Contrary to Aetna's Fact Statement no. 12

(Aetna Brief, p. 17), the Bond does not specifically exclude
fees incurred in defending securities claims.
14.

Home's obligation to notify Aetna of a loss or

potential loss is governed by Section 4 of the Conditions and
Limitations Section of the Bond and by Rider 6091.

Rider 6091

amends Section 4 to require that Home notify Aetna of potential
losses covered under the Bond, as well as covered losses
already sustained.

With regard to potential losses, the Bond

requires that notice be given "when the Insured becomes aware
of facts which would cause a reasonable person to assume that a
loss covered by the bond . . . will be sustained."
15.

Rider 6030(a) excludes from coverage "loss resulting

directly or indirectly from trading."
16.

Section 11 (1[ 3) of the Bond provides that:

"This

bond shall be terminated or cancelled as to any Employee-(a) as
soon as the Insured shall learn of any dishonest or fraudulent
act on the part of such Employee . . ."
17.

Aetna, under the terms of the Bond, and pursuant to

Home's request, extended coverage under the Bond through August
20, 1986.

(Pretrial Order, Stip. Fact no. 21, R. 727).
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III.

Larry Glad's employment at Home Savings.
18.

Prior to working for Home Savings, Larry Glad worked

as a loan officer under Bill Cox's supervision at Miller &
Viehle, a Salt Lake City based mortgage company.

Glad was one

of Miller & Viehle's top producers and, during his employment
there, earned Cox's confidence.
19.

(Cox, R. 2914.60-.65).

Cox, by 1981, headed Home's mortgage loan department

and managed its 33rd South office.
commissioned loan solicitor.
June 1, 1981.
20.

Cox hired Larry Glad as a

Glad started at Home Savings on

(Smolka, R. 2921.127,-.130; Cox, 2914.70).

On or about December 20, 1981, Bill Cox was told that

Larry Glad had taken a fee in addition to his regular
commission for arranging a loan.

(Pretrial Order, Stip. Fact,

no. 6, R. 724). Cox received confirmation of the charge about
a week later.
21.

(Cox, R. 2914.137).

Cox terminated Glad effective December 29, 1981,

immediately upon Glad's return from a weeklong Christmas
vacation.

Independently, Home's management had determined to

terminate Glad for reasons unrelated to his taking of a fee.
(Smolka, R. 2917.37-.39; Cox, R. 2914.136).
IV.

The AFCO and AFCO-investor loans.
22.

AFCO was a series of real estate development companies

which built, managed, and marketed a number of Utah
developments, primarily the Sherwood Hills resort near Logan,
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and the Glenmoor Village planned residential community in South
Jordan.
23.

(Stip. Statement read to jury),
Prior to 1982, Grant Affleck, AFCO's President,

initiated a massive effort to raise funds for AFCO.

His

approach usually required an investor to take out a second
mortgage loan on his or her home and invest the loan proceeds
in AFCO.

AFCO would promise to repay the loan together with

additional consideration being promised to the investor.

Home

made such second mortgage loans as did sixteen other Utah-based
financial institutions.
24.

Home's involvement with AFCO and borrowers who

invested in AFCO began in early Fall, 1981, when Larry Glad
approached Bill Cox and advised him about a potential referral
of $3 million in second mortgage loans.
25.

(Cox, R. 2914.99).

In early November, 1981, Glad.arranged a meeting

between Affleck and Home officers Bradshaw, Smolka, and Cox
(Smolka, R. 2921.135-.136).

At the meeting, Affleck requested

(1) that Home loan $300,000 directly to AFCO, to be secured by
Glenmoor Village condominiums and (2) that Home fund up to $3
million in second mortgage loans which AFCO would refer.
(Smolka, R. 2921.136-.141; Cox, R. 2914.100-.103).
26.

Home loaned AFCO $100,000 on November 10, 1981, based

on the strength of the collateral and a positive confirmation
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of AFCO's payment history from Deseret Federal•

(Smolka, R.

2921.146-.150; Trial Exh. 17). AFCO later repaid its loan.
27.

On or about November 10, 1981, Cox, acting on

instructions from Fred Smolka, typed up letters committing Home
to fund up to $3 million in second-mortgage loans, which would
be referred by AFCO.

(Trial Exh. 12; R. 2914.106).

The

letters contemplated that all referred applications would have
to meet certain underwriting standards:

among others, that

first and second mortgages, together, could not exceed 80% of
value; qualified appraisals would be required; and
homeowners/borrowers would be personally responsible for
repaying loans.
28.

(Trial Exh. 11).

On November 18, 1981, Home's Board of Directors

approved Home's participation in the second-mortgage program;
but conditioned participation on (1) Home's securing a
commitment in the secondary market to purchase the loans and
(2) having each borrower acknowledge that he/she was personally
responsible for repaying the loan.

(Trial Exh. 39). Wallace

Woodbury, Home's counsel, thereafter prepared acknowledgment
letters for borrowers to sign.
29.

(Trial Exh. 89, 90).

From mid-November, 1981 through early January, 1982,

Home processed, approved and funded forty-two second-mortgage
loans (Pretrial Order, Stipulated Fact no. 4, Re 723).
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30.

The loans were "processed" by Larry Glad, with the

assistance of an AFCO secretary, Valerie Kosta Parker, whom
AFCO had made available to help with typing and paperwork on
the loan applications referred by AFCO.
31.

(Cox, R. 2914.132).

Home's underwriter Bill Cox approved each of the

forty-two loans Home made, on the mistaken assumption that the
credit, income and other information in the loan file was
accurate and had been properly verified.
2905.86).

(Cox, R. 2906.61-.62,

Each loan was also reviewed and approved by MGIC

Insurance Co. and either Rocky Mountain Federal or First
Federal Savings of Great Falls, two institutions which
purchased the second-mortgage loans.
32.

(Cox, R. 2905.78).

When certain of the second mortgage loans went into

default in late February, 1982, Home (1) re-reviewed the loan
documentation and verified that each borrower had acknowledged
responsibility to repay the loan and (2) interviewed Cox and
Elaine Reese concerning the processing and closing of the
loans.

Home concluded that the notes and trust deeds were

enforceable.

(Woodbury, R. 2916.221 -.225; Smolka, R.

2919.52-.56; Trial Exh. Ill, p. 2 ) .
33.

In April, 1982, several hundred persons who had

borrowed money from various financial institutions joined to
collectively file an action in the recently instituted AFCO
bankruptcy proceedings, entitled Alcorn v. Affleck.
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The Alcorn

Complaint named seventeen financial institutions among its 68
named defendants and set forth numerous causes of actions which
allegedly applied across the board to all of the institutions.
34•

On July 2, 1982, the above-mentioned borrowers filed

essentially the same Complaint in the United States District
Court, designated Abbott v. Schaffer, the Bankruptcy Court
having concluded it lacked jurisdiction.

On or about July 22,

1982, the action was severed as to each financial institution.
The severed portion relating to Home was designated Armitaae v.
Home Savings (C82-0670K).
726).

(Pretrial Order Stip. Fact, R.

Plaintiffs included 36 of the 42 couples who had

borrowed from Home to invest in AFCO.

Discovery in Armitaae

began in earnest in the Fall of 1982.
35.

On August 14, 1984, the Armitaae jury returned a

Special Verdict against Home, which found Home liable on five
of the over twenty theories Plaintiffs pursued.

(Pretrial

Order, Stip. Fact. no. 20, R. 727).
36.

On February 24, 1986, the Court entered judgment in

the Armitaae case, formally voiding the Plaintiffs' notes and
trust deeds.
37.

(Pretrial Order, Stip. Fact. nos. 22, 23, R. 727).

The Court also, on March 21, 1986, ordered that Home

pay the Armitaae Plaintiffs their attorneys fees, in the amount
of $381,294.62.

After negotiating a reduction, Home paid

$190,647.31.
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V.

Glad's dishonest conduct.
The evidence of Glad's dishonesty, in connection with his

introduction of AFCO to Home and his role in the processing and
closing of second mortgage loans, included the following:
38.

In the Fall of 1981, AFCO, unknown to Home Savings,

was in extreme financial difficulty.
Westergard, R. 2910.18-.71).

(Broadbent, R. 2906.151;

Affleck told Bob Mitchell,

brother of his secretary Cindy Mitchell (Broadbent) that AFCO
desperately needed additional money; that he would pay a
handsome fee to anyone who could arrange for additional funds;
and that he didn't care how the money was obtained.

(Mitchell,

R. 2914.14-.15).
39.

Bob Mitchell, two days later, introduced Affleck to

Larry Glad at a meeting in Glad's office at Home Savings.
(Mitchell, R. 2914.16).

Mitchell believed that Glad might be

willing to help because (1) Glad had been more than willing to
alter information on his sister's loan application (inflated
income, lengthened time of employment) to enable her to qualify
for credit, (Mitchell, R. 2914.13-.14; Broadbent, R. 2906.154);
and (2) Glad, unknown to Home, had diverted to his personal use
a $14,000 loan commitment payment made to Home by Mitchell's
company, IVEL Construction.

Glad admitted to Mitchell he had

used the $14,000 to purchase cocaine.
2914.10-.13).
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(Mitchell, R.

40.

After the initial meeting with Affleck, Glad told

Mitchell, "I've got him.

He is in a sinking ship.

There is

nobody else in town that will touch him on financing, and I can
put these together for him.M
off it."

Glad added, "I'll make a fortune

(Mitchell, R. 2914.19).

In a follow-up meeting about

mid to late October at Gino's, a restaurant next door to Home
Savings, Cindy Mitchell testified that Glad told Affleck he
could do loans referred by AFCO "if the price was right."
(Broadbent, R. 2906.154).
41.

Glad assured Affleck that Home could process $3.1 or

$3.3 million in loans, provided that AFCO pay a 1% origination
fee directly to Mitchell out of the initial loan to AFCO.
(Broadbent, R. 2906.155-.156).

Glad, without Home's knowledge,

had Affleck sign a document authorizing a $31,000 fee to
Mitchell (Trial Exh. 1, 2 ) . Glad proposed to Mitchell that
Mitchell keep $14,000 as repayment for the diverted money; and
that he, unknown to Home, would keep the rest.

(Mitchell, R.

2914.21).
42.

Prior to making the $100,000 loan to AFCO, Glad

obtained credit reports on AFCO, Affleck, and Carvel Shaffer,
each which contained adverse credit information.

(Trial Exh.

13, 14, 15). Glad withheld the negative reports from his
supervisors, who never saw them.

(Smolka, R. 2919.19-.21; Cox,

R. 2914.111).
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43.

On November 10/ Glad arranged to close the AFCO loan

himself (Smolka/ R. 2919.24)/ in place of Elaine Reese/ Home's
regular

,f

loan closer/" who was absent from work that day (Cox#

R. 2914.108-.110).

When Cox asked Glad to show him the closing

statement/ the penciled-in statement Glad showed to Cox did not
list the $31/000 disbursement to Bob Mitchell/ though the typed
statement/ which AFCO signed/ did show the fee.

(Trial Exh.

17/ p.2). Glad caused Home to issue a check to Mitchell for
$31/000 (Trial Exh. 320)/ which Mitchell then split with Glad.
44.

Many of the second-mortgage loan applications AFCO

referred to Home had been rejected by other institutions.
(Parker/ R. 2913.21).

When Cindy Mitchell volunteered this

negative information to Glad he responded that that would be no
problem.
45.

(Broadbent/ R. 2906.158).
Cox instructed Glad to call each of the borrowers who

had previously submitted loan applications to AFCO, and confirm
(1) that they were still interested in borrowing against the
equity in their homes and (2) that the information in their
application was still accurate.

Two days later Glad gave a

list of names to Cox (Trial Exh. 71), whom he said he had
called.

(Cox, R. 2914.115-.116).

Borrowers whose names were

on Glad's list testified that Glad had never called them.
(E.g. Devey, R. 2911.144).
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46.

Parker, whom Affleck had made available to Home to

assist in processing the second mortgage loans, testified that
Affleck "told me to go to Home Savings and do what Larry Glad
wanted me to do.
(R. 2913.21).

Get those loans through and hurry it up."

After she had helped at Home for about a week,

Glad ordered her to alter data on a loan application.
R. 2913.30).
to Affleck.

Parker, troubled about the incident, complained
"He [Affleck] told me to do exactly what Larry

Glad wanted me to do."
47.

(Parker,

(R. 2913.30-.31).

Once, when Parker protested Glad's instruction that

she forge a signature, Glad became irritated and said, "Its
very simple, Valerie.

You just take it and you just do like

this," and he signed the person's name.
don't want to have to do this.
it from here on out."
48.

Then he added, "Now, I

I want you to just take care of

(Parker, R. 2913.35-.36).

As it became evident that certain borrowers AFCO had

referred could not otherwise qualify for loans, Glad ordered
that employment dates, income levels, debts, etc. be altered to
ensure that borrowers would qualify.

(Broadbent,

R. 2906.160-.161; Parker, R. 2913.32-.33; Phippen, R.
2905.210).

Signatures of borrowers on applications and

employers on employment verifications were forged.

(Parker,

R. 2913.30,-.34; Cassul, R. 2920.84-.86; F.W. Witt, R.
2905.144,-.148; Pehrson, R. 2905.192,-.194; Rosenloff,
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R. 2905.264; Sadler, R. 2910.101)•

Other alterations included

fabrication of letters to explain away negative credit reports
(Sadler, R. 2910.101); invention of fictitious savings accounts
(F.W. Witt, R. 2905.15); inflation of the value of borrowers'
assets (Phippen, R. 2905.209); and, as Mrs. Richards testified,
"Our ages were [lowered] to 50 years, bless them."

(R.

2905.247).
49.

Loan documents were backdated by Elaine Reese to

circumvent the borrowers* three day right of rescission, to
allow immediate disbursement of funds to AFCO, on Glad's false
assurance to Reese that Cox had ordered and approved backdating
of all the loans.
50.

(Reese, R. 2918.111-.113).

With Glad's knowledge, Parker notarized trust deeds

and other documents, though she had not been present when they
were signed.
51.

(Parker, R. 2913.51-.53).

Following the November 18 Board Meeting (referred to

in If 28 above), Cox instructed Glad and Reese that one or the
other of them was to personally close all subsequent loans.
(Cox, R. 2905.62).

Contrary to Cox's express instruction, Glad

gave loan files to Affleck to close.
Smolka, R. 2919.17).

(Broadbent, R. 2906.180;

Affleck told borrowers that AFCO would

make their loan payments for them.

He showed borrowers where

to sign, explained none of the documents, and let none of the
borrowers read them.

Virtually every borrower testified that
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had a Home employee been present to explain the documents they
were asked to sign, that they would not have signed the
documents.

(Mrs. Witt, R. 2905.172; Gleed, R. 2905.184;

Pehrson, R. 2905.200; O.T. Farnsworth, R. 2905.228; O.F.
Farnsworth, R. 2905.235; Richards, R. 2905.243; Chandler, R.
2905.257; Rosenloff, R. 2905.263; Scoville, R. 2911.18).
52.

Contrary to Aetna's assertion throughout its Brief

that Home had discovered Glad's dishonesty vis-a-vis the
AFCO-investor loans prior to June 21, 1982, the evidence in the
record indicates that Home did not discover Glad's dishonest
activity in connection with the AFCO-investor loans until
doscovery was underway in Armitage, in October-December, 1982.
(Smolka, R. 2917.22-.26,.40-.41, -.46, 2919.24-.25,.52-.53,-.56,
-.75-.78, 2920.59; Woodbury, R. 2916.223-.227; Cox, R. 2905.86;
Trial Exh. Ill, p. 2 ) .
53.

Aetna's assertion that the Federal Home Loan Bank's

Report of Examination, under date of June 4, 1982, was
"complete" as of that date and that "Home Savings had immediate
access to that report" (see Aetena Brief, Fact Statement
B-2-m), is in error.

June 4, 1982 was when the federal

examiners began their examination at Home Savings; Home did not
receive a copy of the report until approximately September,
well after Aetna's Bond was in place.

(H. Bradshaw, R.

2907.155-.159; R. Greenwood, R. 2916.195; E. Weis, R.
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2909.152).

Also, contrary to Aetna's Fact Statement no. 2-n,

the examiner who wrote the report did not conclude that Home's
"management," apart from the conduct of its employees, had
subjected Home to possible losses.
54.

(Greenwood, R. 2916.185).

When it completed the Application for the Aetna Bond,

Home had no idea that it might one day sustain a loss on the
AFCO-investor loans, that would later give rise to a fidelity
claim against Aetna's Bond.
VI.

(Smolka, R. 2917.40-.41,-.46).

Glad's use of cocaine.
55.

Following his departure from Miller & Viehle and prior

to his employment at Home Savings, Glad had begun using cocaine
in significant quantities.

(Wolfe (Glad's first wife), R.

2918.208,-.210-.228); Rasmussen, R. 2923.23).
56.

Bob Mitchell testified that in the October-December,

1981 time frame he observed Glad on numerous occasions using
cocaine (R. 2914.29 -.27,.46) and estimated that Glad's habit
cost $300-$500 a day (R. 2914.37).
57.

Dr. Gary Jorgensen, whose specialty is treatment of

drug addicts, indicated that a $300 to $500 a day habit would
categorize Glad as a heavy user, who would be willing to steal
and deceive in order to obtain the money he needed to support
his habit. (R. 2907.35-.37).
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VII.

Home's interaction with Aetna.
58.

Based on information it had discovered during the

course of depositions in Armitage, Home notified Aetna in
December, 1982, that the plaintiffs' claims might give rise to
a covered loss under the Bond.

(Smolka, R. 2919.75•-78; Trial

Exh. 119, 120).
59.

In early 1983, Aetna hired a Salt Lake City law firm

(Suitter, Axland) to monitor the Armitage litigation, to review
pleadings, sit in on depositions, etc.

(Pretrial Order, R.

726) .
60.

On September 30, 1983, Aetna advised Home in writing

that the pleadings it had reviewed (the same ones Aetna
highlights in its Brief) did not set forth any claims that
would be covered under its Bond and declined to defend Home.
(Trial Exh. 140).
61.

Aetna has retained the premiums paid by Home to

purchase its Bond and at no time, during the pendency of the
Armitage or this litigation, ever tendered the premiums back to
Home.
62.

(R. 2918.85-.86).
Home sustained a net principal loss in the amount of

$998,623 on its second mortgage loans when the Armitage Court,
on February 24, 1986 entered judgment avoiding the plaintiffs'
notes and trust deeds.

See Aetna Fact Statement no. 16 (Aetna

Brief, p. 18). In the present action, Home requests that Aetna
indemnify it for this loss, pursuant to the terms of its Bond.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: AETNA MUST INDEMNIFY HOME FOR LOSSES SUSTAINED AND
DISCOVERED DURING THE BOND PERIOD.
The Trial Court's denial of Aetna's motion for summary
judgment re: discovery of loss should be affirmed because (1)
material facts and inferences from facts were in dispute,
contrary to Aetna's mischaracterization of the record, and (2)
Aetna's analysis of the Bond is flawed.
Aetna's Bond obligates it to indemnify Home for fidelity
"loss sustained . • . at anytime but discovered during the Bond
Period."

Aetna concedes Home sustained its loss only when the

Armitaae Court avoided the Armitage plaintiffs' notes and trust
deeds.

Such loss could not have been discovered earlier.

Thus, Home both "sustained" and "discovered" its "loss" during
the Aetna Bond Period.

Aetna, however, erroneously contends

that for purposes of coverage, "loss" is "discovered" not when
or after it is sustained, but when the insured becomes "aware"
of conditions which may or may not someday result in a loss.
In so doing, Aetna confuses the separate issues of "coverage"
and "notice."

Aetna's argument (1) is not supported by the

language of its Bond; (2) ignores that its contract is one of
indemnity; and (3) is mistakenly based on case law which
addresses the issue of "notice," not "coverage."
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POINT II: SECTION 11 DOES NOT EXCUSE AETNA'S OBLIGATION TO
INDEMNIFY HOME SAVINGS FOR LOSSES SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF
LARRY GLAD'S DISHONEST CONDUCT.
Section 11 of Aetna's Bond eliminates coverage for loss
caused by dishonest conduct of an employee where, once an
employee is discovered to be dishonest, he remains in the
insured's employ and thereafter engages in similar dishonest
conduct which produces a loss.

The policy behind Section 11

to shift risk of loss for the subsequent misconduct from the
insurer to the trusting insured.

Aetna suggests that Section

11 goes much further; that it elimiates coverage not only for
subsequent misconduct, but also for subsequent losses, even i
caused by misdeeds committed prior to or contemporaneous with
discovery of the dishonesty.

Section 11, however, was not

intended to revoke or prospectively deny coverage for losses
that later come to fruition as a result of an employee's prio
dishonest conduct.

Section 11, under the facts of this case,

does not excuse Aetna's obligation to indemnify Home's
otherwise covered loss.
POINT III: AETNA MAY NOT USE THE JURY-S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4 TO AVOID THE JUDGMENT.
Aetna asks this Court to reverse the Judgment based on
answers to two special interrogatories, in which the jury
concluded that Home had unintentionally failed to disclose
material information to Aetna.

The Trial Court properly

disregarded the jury's answer to Interrogatory no. 2, finding
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there was no evidence in the record of nondisclosure of
material information in response to any question asked in the
Application.

Moreover, all of Aetna's marshalled evidence

concerns information about which Aetna simply made no inquiry
in its Application, a distinction that renders both the
marshalled evidence and former Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8
inapplicable.

The Trial Court also properly concluded that the

jury's answer to Interrogatory no. 4 could not provide a basis
for voiding the Bond, because an insured has no duty to
volunteer information not requested by the Application.
Two independent grounds further support affirmation of the
Trial Court's ruling.

First, Aetna is not entitled to the

remedy of rescission because it never clearly elected
rescission and never tendered to Home the premiums Home paid,
but instead chose to keep the premiums and to defend and deny
coverage.

Second, the jury's role with respect to Aetna's

equitable claim was purely advisory.

Thus, the Trial Court was

free to disregard the jury's response to Interrogatory no. 2.
POINT IV: AETNA MAY NOT USE THE TRADING EXCLUSION TO AVOID
PAYING HOME'S LOSSES.
Rider 6030(a), which excludes from coverage losses
resulting from "trading," formed the basis for Aetna's second
motion for summary judgment.

Thereafter, Aetna abandoned the

defense; dropped it from the Pretrial Order and presented no
evidence on the defense at trial.

In so doing, it waived the
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defense.

In any event/ the Trial Court correctly denied

Aetna's motion because the securities law violations for which
Home was found liable in Armitage do not equate to "trading, ••
as used in Rider 6030(a).

At best, the -trading loss"

exclusion, as applied to the second mortgage loans Home made in
this case, is ambiguous, warranting the conclusion that Home's
otherwise indemnifiable losses are not excluded from coverage.
POINT V: NO BASIS EXISTS FOR AETNA1S CLAIMS THAT THE JURY WAS
IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED AND THAT AETNA WAS PREJUDICED IN
SUBMITTING ITS THEORY OF THE CASE.
Aetna asserts that the Court improperly instructed the jury
and prevented Aetna from presenting its theory of causation to
the jury.

Aetna's argument is without merit because (1) the

error Aetna now asserts was not properly preserved for appeal,
Utah R. Civ. P. 51, and (2) the jury was properly instructed.
Moreover, Aetna was permitted to present its "sole, sufficient
cause" theory to the jury:

it presented evidence consistent

with its theory; the instructions that were given allowed it to
present its theory; and it argued its theory in closing
argument.

Finally, Aetna's assertion that the jury should have

been allowed to "apportion cause" between Glad's dishonesty and
Home's mismanagement is contrary to the law and is contrary to
what Aetna, before the Trial Court, conceded was the law.
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POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO EITHER DISMISS HOME'S COMPLAINT OR REQUIRE JOINDER
OF F&D OF MARYLAND.
Aetna contends that the Trial Court should have required
that F&D of Maryland be joined as a party, yet it offers no
compelling reason why F&D's presence was necessary.

The Trial

Court, in denying Aetna's motion, listed in detail its
findings, stating why F&D was not an indispensable party —
of which Aetna simply ignores in its Brief.

all

F&D's presence was

not necessary for the Trial Court and this Court to interpret
the contract of insurance between Home and Aetna.

Furthermore,

neither F&D nor Aetna was prejudiced by F&D's absence.
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED AETNA'S BELATED
REQUEST TO "OFFSET" HOME SAVING'S JUDGMENT.
After trial, Aetna sought for the first time an "offset" to
Home's damages. The Trial Court rejected Aetna's belated
request because Aetna neither reserved the issue of offset nor
sought an offset until well after trial.
right to a jury trial on this issue.

Home never waived its

The Trial Court's refusal

to entertain Aetna's untimely request should be affirmed.
POINT VIII: THE JUDGMENT PROPERLY INCLUDES $190,647.31 IN
ATTORNEYS FEES THAT HOME SAVINGS PAID TO THE ARMITAGE
PLAINTIFFS.
Home's claim for reimbursement of attorneys fees it was
ordered to pay in the Armitage litigation was reserved for
determination by the Trial Court following trial.
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Second-guessing the Trial Court's ruling, Aetna argues (1) that
Elaine Reese, not Larry Glad, caused the loss; (2) that its
Bond covers only Mmalum in seM conduct; and (3) that the
trading exclusion rider excludes the loss from coverage.
Aetna's first argument, as the Trial Court found, ignores the
substantial involvement of Larry Glad in the backdating of loan
documents.

The second argument is just plain wrong; conduct

need not be criminal to be "dishonest" under Rider 6041.

The

third argument ignores that the Armitaae Court based its award
independently on the federal truth-in-lending statute, which
provides a basis for the fees award clearly beyond the reach of
the "trading exclusion" rider.
POINT IX: THE TRIAL COURT, PURSUANT TO STIPULATION OF THE
PARTIES, PROPERLY AWARDED HOME SAVINGS ITS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS
FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDING IN THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION.
Just prior to entry of judgment, Aetna stipulated that the
"costs and reasonable attorneys fees" to which Home was
entitled under Agreement C of the Bond was $437,500, and the
Court entered judgment based on the Stipulation.

In its

Stipulation, Aetna waived the legal argument it now tries to
assert on appeal.

Furthermore, there is no factual nor legal

basis for Aetna's claim that Home should be awarded only
one-seventh the fees Aetna stipulated were "reasonable."

- 32 -

RULES FOR CONSTRUING AMBIGUITY
IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Aetna's introductory summary of the law on construction of
insurance contracts is accurate—as far as it goes.

However,

Aetna deftly avoids mentioning how ambiguity in a policy of
insurance is to be construed.
Ambiguity in Aetna's Bond may need to be addressed by this
Court.

The test for determining whether language in a policy

of insurance is ambiguous is set forth in LPS Hospital v.
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1988).

The

test is:
Would the meaning [of the language of the
insurance contract] be plain to a person of
ordinary intelligence and understanding,
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in
accordance with the usual and natural
meaning of the words, and in the light of
existing circumstances, including the
purpose of the policyt?]
As Aetna notes, jjE the terms of an insurance policy are clear
and unambiguous, they will be interpreted in accordance with
their plain and ordinary meaning.

Valley Bank and Trust Co. v.

U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah
App. 1989).

If, however, the terms are ambiguous, they will be

interpreted in favor of the insured, in favor of coverage.
Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., supra.

Provisions

purporting to exclude coverage, in particular, "are strictly
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured."
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LPS

Vallev Bank and Trust, supra at 936.

As the Utah Supreme Court

has held:
This Court is committed to the policy that,
in case of ambiguity, uncertainty, or doubt,
the terms of an insurance contract will be
construed strictly against the insurer and
in favor of the insured, and that the
insured is entitled to the broadest
protection that he could reasonably believe
the commonly understood meaning of its terms
afforded him.
P.E. Ashton Co. v. Jovner, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965).
Similarly, applications for insurance are subject to the
same rules of construction.

Insurers, since they frame the

inquiries, must keep them free of misleading interpretations.
Wardle v. International Health & Life Ins. Co., 551 P.2d 623,
626 (Ida. 1976).

All ambiguities in applications for

insurance, accordingly, will be strictly construed against the
insurer which drafted the questions.

2 Couch on Insurance 2d

§ 15.90 (1984); Wardle, supra at 626; Purcell v. Washington
Fidelity Nat'1. Ins. Co., 16 P.2d 639 (Ore. 1932).

M

If any

construction can reasonably be put on the question and the
answer [in the application for insurance] such as will avoid a
forfeiture of the policy on the ground of falsity in the
answer, that construction will be given, and the policy will be
sustained.H

Olinqer Mutual Benefit Ass'n. v. Christy, 342 P.2d

1000, 1005 (Colo. 1959), quoting Service Life Ins. Co. of
Omaha, Neb, v. McCullough, 234 Iowa 817, 13 N.W.2d 440 (1944).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AETNA MUST INDEMNIFY HOME FOR COVERED LOSSES SUSTAINED AND
DISCOVERED DURING THE BOND PERIOD.
Aetna's Bond obligates Aetna to indemnify Home Savings for
"loss sustained at any time but discovered during the Bond
Period."

Home sustained its losses on the AFCO-investor loans

when the Armitaae Court voided the borrower's notes and trust
deeds, during the time the Aetna Bond was in place.

Prior to

the verdict in Armitaae, Home had sustained no loss on the
AFCO-investor loans which it could have discovered.

Indeed,

Aetna has acknowledged that "Plaintiff had no damages until the
entry of the judgment, and therefore it had no claim against
Aetna. . ."

(R. 2169).

In sharp contrast to these plain facts, Aetna contends in
Point III of its Brief that "loss" is "discovered" not when the
loss is sustained, or later, but, rather, when the insured
learns of dishonest conduct of an employee which may or may not
result in loss at some time in the future.

Aetna moved for

summary judgment asserting that, because Home allegedly knew of
Glad's dishonest conduct before purchasing the Bond, it had
"discovered the loss before the Bond went into effect."
(Aetna's Motion, R. 196-197; Memo, at R. 200-201.20).

In

response, Home disputed both Aetna's legal theory and its
factual allegation that Home, prior to June, 1982, knew of
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Glad's dishonest conduct vis-a-vis the AFCO-investor loans.
(R. 284, 286.2-.4, 286.15-.20, 209.32 n. 1&3, 209.33 n. 7 ) .
At the same time, because Home could not have discovered
any loss until, at the earliest, the Armitage jury verdict on
August 14, 1984, or, as Aetna contends, entry of the Armitage
judgment on February 24, 1986 (both during the Bond period),
Home sought a judicial determination that "Home both sustained
a 'loss1 and 'discovered* that 'loss' during the period the
Aetna Bond was in effect".

(Home's Motion for a Court Order

Construing the Aetna Bond, R. 218-220; Memo, at R. 208-209.34),
The Trial Court granted Home's motion, stating:
This Court specifically rules that plaintiff
sustained a "loss," as the term "loss" is
contemplated in the Aetna Bond, on August
14, 1984. Accordingly, plaintiff discovered
its "loss sustained" during the period the
Aetna Bond was in effect.
(Order construing the Bond, R. 385) . In addition, the Court
issued a four-page Order and Memorandum Decision (R. 344-347),

1

Aetna's statement at page 43 of its Brief that "the Trial
Court considered the evidence at summary judgment and ruled as
a matter of law that before Home purchased the Aetna Bond, it
was aware of Larry Glad's conduct and the problems with the
AFCO investor loans," blatantly mistates the record. Compare
to Court's actual ruling quoted infra at 37. Similarly, the
partial, out-of-context quotation attributed to the Court at
page 37 of Aetna's Brief misstates the record. The Court
assumed knowledge of Glad's dishonesty for the purpose of
ruling on the parties' motions. However, it made no factual
finding, nor could it have, given that Home disputed Aetna's
allegation.
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which rejected Aetna's argument that "loss" can somehow be
discovered three and one-half years before it actually occurs,
thereby precluding coverage.

The Trial Court held:

For purposes of this motion, the court
assumes the evidence establishes as a matter
of law that the dishonesty of plaintiff's
employee, Larry Glad, was known before the
policy period commenced on June 21, 1982.
This discovery of the dishonesty, however,
is not discovery of a loss sustained. It is
not the dishonesty which is insured, but the
loss sustained thereby. There is no
evidence that there was any loss sustained
prior to the judgment in or settlement of
the Armitage case. The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board Report (Def. App. 0), dated June
4, 1982, itself indicates that plaintiff
Home Savings was subjected only to "possible
losses." A loss cannot be discovered until
sustained: since the latter occurred during
the policy period, the discovery thereof
could not have occurred earlier.
(R. 344-345) (Emphasis added).
If Aetna is appealing the denial of its motion for summary
judgment, then Aetna's appeal fails because there were material
facts or inferences from facts in dispute; and Aetna has not
demonstrated that Home could not have prevailed on this issue
at trial.

Aetna tries to finesse this obstacle by pretending

that the Court found "as a matter of law" that "before Home
Savings purchased the Aetna Bond, it was aware of Larry Glad's
conduct and the problems with the AFCO-investor loans."

(Aetna

Brief, p. 43). As noted above, the Court made no such finding
"as a matter of law," or otherwise.
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If on the other hand, Aetna's appeal is from the Order
construing the Bond (R. 384), the appeal fails because Aetna's
legal analysis is mistakenly based, not on the Bond's coverage
provisions, but rather on its notice provisions and case law
interpreting an insured's obligation to give timely notice of
loss or potential loss.
A.

THE ISSUE OF "COVERAGE" IS DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE 03?
"NOTICE", WHICH AETNA HAS NOT APPEALED.

At the outset, it is important to distinguish between
"coverage" and the obligation to give "notice" of potential
loss.

The Trial Court's Order and Decision resolved only the

issue of coverage.

The obligation to give notice, however, is

a different issue, which is based on separate and distinct
provisions of the Bond.

Aetna has not appealed from the

Court's rulings on the issue of notice.
(1)

"Coverage" is governed by the "Preamble" and Rider
6041.

The issue of coverage with respect to fidelity claims is
governed by what Aetna refers to as the "Preamble" (Bond, p. 2,
1f 1) and Rider 6041.

The Preamble, which applies to all the

various types of risks insured by the Bond, obligates Aetna to
indemnify the Insured for "loss sustained . . . at any time but
discovered during the Bond Period."

Rider 6041 provides that

the Bond insures against "loss resulting directly from one or
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more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an employee, committed
anywhere and committed alone or in collusion with others
. • •"

The Preamble, together with Rider 6041, thus determine

Aetna's obligation to indemnify Home for losses caused by an
employee's dishonest conduct.

The propriety of the Court's

pretrial coverage ruling must be evaluated against these
provisions.
(2)

The obligation to give HnoticeH is governed by Section
4 of the "Conditions and Limitations" Section and bv
Rider 6091.

An entirely separate issue in this lawsuit concerned Home's
obligation to give notice.

This obligation is prescribed by

"Section 4" of the "Conditions and Limitations" segment of
Aetna's Bond, as modified by Rider 6091(1[ 2).

Section 4

provides that "at the earliest practical moment after discovery
of loss hereunder the Insured shall give the Underwriter
written notice."

Rider 6091, which is tacked onto and amends

Section 4, defines "discovery" and further obligates the
insured to give notice of a potential loss.

Rider 6091(1f 2)

states:
2.

The attached bond is further amended by
inserting the following as the final
paragraph of Section 4:
"Discovery occurs when the Insured
becomes aware of facts which would
cause a reasonable person to assume
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that a loss covered by the bond has
been or will be incurred even though
the exact amount or details of loss may
not be then known. Notice to the
insured of an actual or potential claim
by a third party which alleges that the
Insured is liable under circumstances,
which, if true, would create a loss
under this bond constitutes such
discovery.H
Neither Section 4 nor Rider 6091 is an -insuring agreement,"
and neither purports to amend the coverage language of the
-insuring agreements- segment of the Bond.
Aetna reserved for trial the issue of whether the notice
given by Home in December 1982 was timely.

(Pretrial Order, R.

719 at 721, 729). It put on evidence at trial.

The Trial

Court, however, ruled that Aetna failed to prove it was
prejudiced by any alleged failure on Home's part to timely
notify Aetna of a potential loss and declined to submit the
issue of notice to the jury.

(R. 2923.218-.220; R. 1337).

Aetna has not appealed the Court's ruling on "notice."

Yet

Aetna devotes much of its brief enumerating lawsuits in which
Home was involved in 1982.

The existence of these lawsuits,

however, does not alter when Home discovered it had actually
sustained a loss.

Moreover, though Aetna now attaches

significance to these lawsuits, it conveniently fails to
mention that, having itself reviewed these very same lawsuits,
it wrote Home on September 30, 1983 and advised it that the
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allegations set forth in those lawsuits did not state any
claims covered by the Bond.

(Trial Exh. 140). Having failed

to prove prejudice with respect to notice and having chosen not
to appeal the Court's ruling on notice, Aetna should not be
permitted to resurrect the issue of "timely noticeM under the
guise of coverage.
B.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING COVERAGE, A "LOSS"
CANNOT BE "DISCOVERED" UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT OCCURS.

This issue turns on when Home discovered that it had
sustained a loss on the AFCO-investor loans.

Did it discover

the loss during the time the Aetna Bond was in effect, in which
case Home's loss is covered by the Bond?

Or, did it somehow

discover it had sustained a "loss" prior to June 21, 1982,
before the Bond became effective, as Aetna asserts?
The Preamble language determines whether an indemnifiable
loss falls before, within, or after the time period the Bond is
in effect. It states:
The Underwriter . . . agrees . . . . with
respect to loss sustained by the Insured at
any time but discovered during the Bond
Period, to indemnify and hold harmless the
Insured for: [various types of loss covered
by the bond].
Very simply, "loss" may be sustained during or prior to the
term of the Bond and still be covered.

Coverage obtains for

loss caused by an employee's dishonesty if during the Bond
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period, the insured (1) can establish that it has sustained a
loss (Preamble)/ and (2) learns the cause of loss which it has
sustained to be dishonesty of an employee (Rider 6041).

Since

Home/ by Aetna's admission/ did not sustain a loss until such
time as the Court in Armitage voided the AFCO-investors' notes
and trust deeds (see Aetna's Brief/ Fact Statement no. 16, p.
18)/ it follows that Home's discovery of a loss covered by the
Bond occurred only once judgment was entered.

Home could not

have discovered the loss more than three and one-half years
earlier, as Aetna asserts.
Nonetheless, Aetna contends that "loss refers to the
awareness of conditions out of which a claim may arise/ not to
the insured's adjudicated liability for that loss."
39).

(Brief/ p.

Aetna's metaphysical definition of "loss," and its

conception of "discovery of loss/" is unpersuasive for the
following reasons: (1) it is inconsistent with the language of
the Bond; (2) it is inconsistent with principles of indemnity
law; (3) it is not supported by the cases Aetna cites; and (4)
it would have adverse policy consequences if adopted as a rule
of law by this Court.
(1)

Aetna's interpretation is inconsistent with the
language of the Bond.

Aetna agreed to indemnify Home "with respect to loss
sustained by [Home] at any time but discovered during the Bond
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period," for "loss resulting directly from dishonest or
fraudulent acts of an employee."

Until an employee's dishonest

act results in actual loss, the insured has no loss to be
indemnified.

As the Trial Court correctly pointed out in its

Memorandum Decision, the Bond insures against "loss" caused by
dishonest conduct.

It does not insure against mere dishonesty
2

in the absence of actual loss.
In contrast, Section 4/Rider 6091(If 2), on which Aetna
relies, does not govern coverage, nor does it amend or modify
the coverage provisions of the Bond.

It does not, for

instance, redefine "loss" or "loss sustained."

Its purpose is

apparent: to encourage insureds to give reasonably prompt
notice to insurers of even potential losses so the insurer can
monitor potential claims and protect its rights.
Aetna's attempt to convert Section 4/Rider 6091 into an
"insuring agreement," or coverage provision, reflects its
fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose, meaning, and
effect of Section 4 and Rider 6091.

These provisions are not

grafted onto the coverage provisions.

Aetna's argument

attempts to change the indemnification language from "loss

z

The clauses in the Preamble, "sustained by the Insured at
any time" and "discovered during the Bond Period" are adjective
clauses. Each clause modifies the noun "loss." Neither clause
modifies or refers to the word "dishonesty," which does not
even appear in the Preamble.
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sustained . . . at any time but discovered during the Bond
Period- to "Aetna may indemnify for loss, but only if the
dishonesty which caused the loss is discovered within the Bond
period." But this is not what the Bond says.

Aetna's tortured

interpretation, which requires that words be given meaning
contrary to their normal usage, at most suggests that there may
be ambiguity in Aetna's Bond.

Home, as the Insured, is

entitled to have such ambiguity construed in its favor and in
favor of coverage.
(2)

Aetna's interpretation is inconsistent with principles
of indemnity law.

Aetna's assertion that -loss" is a state of mental
awareness, and can be discovered long before it occurs, is
irreconcilable with principles of indemnity law.
to indemnify Home for loss it sustained.

Aetna agreed

Fidelity Bond cases

have long held that before an Insured can successfully claim
under a bond, it must first prove that it has sustained "an
actual, present loss."

Continental Cas. Co. v. First Nat'l.

Bank of Temple, 116 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir.), cert, denied 85
L.Ed. 1533 (1941); 35 Am.Jur.2d Fidelity Bonds & Insurance § 39
(1967).

The "indemnitor is not liable for a claim made against

the indemnitee until the indemnitee suffers actual loss by
being compelled to pay the claim."

Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones and

Associates v. Aqrippina Versicherunqes A.G., 476 P.2d 406, 413
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(Cal. 1970)(errors and omissions policy; emphasis added); see
also 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 29 at 720 (1968).
The term "indemnify" has the same meaning in fidelity bond
cases:
[A] contract of fidelity insurance is a
contract against loss. It is a contract of
indemnity on which the insurer is liable
only in the event of loss sustained by the
obligee in consequence of conduct of the
nature specified in the contract. It has
been held that there can be no recovery on a
fidelity bond in the absence of loss or
damage to the insured, and lack of any
pecuniary loss by the obligee from the
wrongful acts constitutes a good defense,
since in such case no recovery can be had.
13 Couch on Insurance 2d § 46:219 at 163 (1982); see also
American Empire Ins. Co. of So. Dakota v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co. of Md., 408 F.2d 72, 77 (5th Cir. 1969)(holding that,
because a fidelity bond is an -indemnity insurance contract,"
M

the insurer's liability does not arise until the insured has

suffered a proven loss.-); In re Schutler, Green & Co., 93 F.2d
810, 812 (4th Cir. 1938); Towne Management Corp. v. Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co., 627 F.Supp. 170, 174 (D. Md. 1985);
American Surety Co. of New York v. Capitol Building & Loan
Ass'n., 50 P.2d 792, 794 (Colo. 1935).3

3

Insurers have used this rule affirmatively in actions
brought by claimants who have obtained a money judgment against
an insured, arguing that until actual financial (continued)
- 45 -

Under principles of indemnity law, Home clearly had no loss
capable of being indemnified prior to June 21, 1982,. Home,
accordingly, could not have discovered it had a covered loss
before it purchased the Aetna Bond, as Aetna contends.
(3)

Aetna's interpretation is not supported by the cases
it cites.

The cases Aetna cites do not support Aetna's erroneous
conclusion that coverage turns on when the insured discovers
evidence of dishonesty on the part of its employee.
First, with two principal exceptions,

USLife Sav. & Loan

Ass'n. v. National Sur. Corp. and Continental Ins. Co. v.
Morgan, Olmstead, the cases Aetna cites address the issue of
timely notice.

They do not address the issue of coverage.

E.g., FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d at 739
(holding, "The word 'loss* as used in the notice requirements
of the bonds means . . . M ) ; Perkins v. Clinton State Bank, 593
F.2d at 333 (stating, -The meaning of 'discovery' in timely
notice provisions has been judicially construed . . . );
Alfalfa Electric Cooperative v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 376
F.Supp. at 906 ("discovery of loss" discussed within context of

3

(continued) detriment is incurred, the insured does not
have a "loss" covered under the Bond. E.g., Ronnau v. Caravan
Intl. Corp., 468 P.2d 118 (Kans. 1970) (emphasizing that a
fidelity bond is a contract of indemnity against loss) .
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whether insured had complied with condition requiring it to
give notice "within a reasonable time after discovery" of any
covered loss).

Likewise, the statement from Couch (Aetna

Brief, p. 39) is lifted from a section entitled "Notice of
Loss."

13A Couch on Insurance 2d § 49:216 at 414 (1982).

The first of the two exceptions, USLife v. National Surety
Corp., 171 Cal. Rptr. 393 (Cal. App. 1981), purports to address
"coverage" and involves successive bonds, but is otherwise
distinguishable.

In USLife, Fireman's Fund issued a Bond,

which was subsequently displaced by a National Surety Bond.
The issue was whether the insured, USLife, could claim against
the second, National Surety Bond.

USLife is distinguishable

because, unlike here, the Court assumed that the Insured's loss
had actually been sustained and was known to have occurred
during the period of the first Bond.

Id. at 396, 398.

The

question addressed was whether USLife had also discovered,
during the term of the first bond, the employee's dishonesty
which caused the loss.

Finding that USLife had both sustained

its loss and discovered the dishonest acts which caused the
loss during the term of the first bond, the Appeals Court
affirmed the Trial Court's judgment in favor of National Surety.
Continental Ins. v. Morgan, Olmstead, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57
(Cal. App. 1978) mentions "discovery of loss" in the context of
coverage, but resolves the issue in a manner that would dictate
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Home's loss being covered by Aetna's Bond.

In Morgan, Olmstead

the claimant was seeking indemnification for attorneys fees it
had expended in successfully defending against a third party
lawsuit, which had liability attached, would have established a
covered loss under one or both of two successive bonds. A
careful reading of Morgan, Olmstead, however, reveals that
Aetna Insurance Co. argued that its Bond, the first one, could
not indemnify its Insured "because the loss was not discovered
until after the policy terminated."

Id. at 60.

The appellate

court resolved the coverage issue by concluding that the bond
language was ambiguous: that "discovery of loss" could be
construed to mean when facts giving rise to a later claim are
discovered by the insured, when a claim is made against the
insured that may result in a judgment, or when the claim is
settled or the judgment paid.

Id. at 66.

Noting that

ambiguity in a policy of insurance must be construed in favor
of coverage, the Court concluded that the insured could
properly claim against either bond.

The same approach applied

here results in the conclusion that Home's loss is covered by
Aetna's Bond.
Moreover, none of Aetna's cases, with the exception of
Continental Ins. v. Morgan, Olmstead, focus, within the context
of coverage, on the situation where discovery of dishonest
conduct precedes incurrence of loss.
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As the California Court

of Appeals later noted in Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust v.
Insurance Co. of No. America, 212 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1985), albeit
in the context of notice, this distinction is especially
important where a dishonest employee induces a financial
institution to make mortgage-backed loans.
However, in the case of a secured loan made
because of fraudulent misrepresentations,
the fraud and the loss do not necessarily
occur at the same time. The loss mav occur
much later or not at all since the debtor
may eventually become creditworthy or the
underlying property may appreciate in value
so that no actual loss is ever suffered.
Id. at 757 (emphasis added).

Pacific-Southern also criticized

the USLife court for assuming that the Insured's loss had
occurred during the period of the first bond, without having
analyzed when, consistent with principles of indemnity law, the
Insured had actually sustained a loss on secured loans it had
made.
(4) Adopting Aetna's interpretation of "Discovery of Loss"
would have adverse policy consequences.
Adoption of Aetna's interpretation of "discovery of loss"
and coverage would have adverse policy consequences in cases
where discovery of dishonesty precedes potential loss and,
hence, discovery of any actual loss sustained.

Insureds, to

protect their rights, would be forced to immediately sue their
carriers even though a loss might never result from the

- 49 -

dishonesty.

At the very least/ judicial economy would be

sacrificed.

Moreover, Aetna's interpretation would force an

insured to defend one lawsuit by denying liability by, for
example, defending the honesty of the person who arguably
caused the loss; while simultaneously prosecuting an action
against its carrier, alleging it had already suffered a "loss"
caused by the dishonesty of its employee.

Such conflict of

interest places the insured in an untenable position.

It would

also prejudice the insurer by discouraging the insured to
vigorously defend third party claims leveled against it, which,
if true, would saddle it with a loss but would make the insurer
liable on its bond.
The Court, in conclusion, correctly interpreted the
coverage provisions of the Bond.

Accordingly, its decision

should be affirmed.
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POINT II.
SECTION 11 DOES NOT EXCUSE AETNA§S
OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY HOME SAVINGS FOR
LOSSES SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF LARRY GLAD'S
DISHONEST CONDUCT.
In Point I of its Brief, Aetna argues that from the moment
it issued its Bond to Home Savings in June 1982, there was no
coverage for Home's losses caused by the dishonest acts of its
former employee Larry Glad - even though the losses were
admittedly sustained only after the Bond was in effect.
Aetna's assertion is unsupported by the language of the Bond
and is inconsistent with the purpose, policy, and philosophy
underlying the Bond.

If adopted, it would produce an

unconscionable result not only here, but in all cases where a
loss is not sustained prior to or contemporaneous with
discovery of a dishonest act.
A.

LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 11.

Section 11, <\\ 3 of the Aetna Bond provides:
This bond shall be deemed terminated or
cancelled as to any Employee - (a) as soon
as the Insured shall learn of any dishonest
or fraudulent act on the part of such
Employee, without prejudice to the loss of
any Property then in transit in the custody
of such Employee.
The obvious purpose of the Section 11 termination-asto-an-employee provision is to mitigate potential losses by
encouraging the insured to remove from its employment persons
whose dishonest proclivities have become known.
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Boston Mutual

Life Insurance Co, v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co,, 613 F.Supp.
1090/ 1102 (D. Mass, 1985).

The philosophy underlying this

provision is that an insured/ once it learns of the dishonest
proclivities of an employee/ ought to bear the risk for loss
caused by subsequent dishonest conduct of that employee, if the
insured elects to keep that person in its employment.
on Insurance 2d § 46:247 (1982).

13 Couch

Noticeably absent from

Section 11 however/ is any language eliminating coverage for
losses that later come to fruition from the discovered act, or
from prior dishonest acts.
Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d
499 (8th Cir. 1970)/ illustrates the context in which Section
11/ or similar language, is intended to function.

In Ritchie

Grocer, the insured (Ritchie) acting upon an employment
application from a Wade Kemp/ contacted the local sheriff who
informed it that nine months earlier Kemp and others had broken
into a business and had stolen tires and money.

Ritchie's

hiring manager dismissed the theft as a boyhood prank and
decided to give Kemp a chance.

Kemp was hired and 18 months

later he embezzled $17/486.20.

When Ritchie then made a claim

on its fidelity bond/ its insurer understandably maintained
that Ritchie/ in knowingly hiring someone who in the past had
stolen, assumed the risk of that person later engaging in
similar dishonest conduct.
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Thus, Section 11 excludes coverage for acts committed after
an insured learns of an employee's dishonesty.

It does not,

however, retroactively revoke coverage for previously committed
misdeeds that subsequently result in loss.

Yet this is the

interpretation Aetna urges. Aetna's superficial Section 11
analysis was considered and rejected by Judge Murphy, who
explained:
[T]he insured is going to take the risk on
an employee for losses sustained as a result
of that employee's conduct after the time it
learned of his or her dishonest conduct.
But if losses occur after thev learn of it,
as a result of his or her conduct, before
the insured learned of it, the insurer is
going to pay.
(R. 2912.209, lines 4-9)(emphasis added).
Aetna's reliance on Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v.
Central Bank of Houston, 672 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App. 1984), is
misplaced.

That decision, although confusing, actually

supports coverage here.

There, the Central Bank of Houston

sustained losses on certain loans made by its president, Joseph
DeLorenzo.

The jury found that the Bank's Board of Directors

learned of a dishonest act on the part of DeLorenzo on or
before December 11, 1974. Consequently, the Court held:
[T]he bond coverage terminated under Section
11 of the bond as to DeLorenzo on December
11, 1974, and appellant is not liable for
any losses resulting from the dishonesty of
DeLorenzo occurring after December 11,
1974. Appellant is only liable for the loss
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found by the jury of a $200/000 loan on
July 22, 1974 before the bond coverage
terminated on December 11, 1974.
(Id. at 650; emphasis added).

As it properly should have, the

Central Bank of Houston Court distinguished between dishonest
acts occuring prior to discovery of dishonesty and those
thereafter.

This is apparent from the Court's holding and the

fact that the court allowed recovery for the July loan, which
likely had not materialized into an actual loss prior to the
December discovery of dishonesty.
Common sense supports Home's analysis.

An insured cannot

control exposure for unknown acts or the later consequences of
previously discovered acts.

That is the very reason for

procuring fidelity insurance coverage.

Aetna's strained

interpretation would effectively convert coverage from "loss
which results from a dishonest act" (Rider 6041) to "loss which
results from and is sustained prior to or contemporaneously
with discovery of the dishonest act."

Yet this language is not

found in the bond, is inconsistent with other provisions of the
4
bond and is contrary to the expectation of the insured. It

4

For example, the Preamble, as noted in the previous
section, obligates Aetna to indemnify loss sustained at any
time. Moreover, Rider 6091 clearly contemplates the
possibility of a future loss covered by the Bond arising out of
the past conduct of an employee, by requiring that the Insured
give notice of "loss covered by the bond [that] will be
incurred . . . "
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is also contrary to the public policy that mandates financial
institutions to obtain insurance protection against loss caused
by dishonesty of its employees.
B.

SECTION 11 DOES NOT AVOID COVERAGE FOR LOSSES
SUSTAINED BY HOME SAVINGS WHICH THE JURY FOUND
RESULTED FROM THE DISHONEST ACTS OF LARRY GLAD.

Prior to trial, the Trial Court ruled as a matter of law
that Home Savings did not sustain a loss on the AFCO-investor
loans until, at the earliest, the Armitaae jury returned its
verdict against Home Savings on August 14, 1984. Aetna
concedes that Home's loss resulted from the Armitaae Judgment.
(Aetna Brief, Fact Statement no. 16, p. 18).
The jury in this case found that Larry Glad engaged in
dishonest conduct, as defined by the Aetna Bond, in connection
with Home's loans to the Armitaae plaintiffs.
Verdict, answer no. 1., R. 1347).

(Special

It next found that the

losses Home sustained in connection with 34 of the 36 loans to
the AFCO investors resulted directly from Glad's dishonest
conduct.

(Special Verdict, answers no. 2 and 3.)

Glad's

dishonesty in connection with those loans attached from their
very inception.

(See Fact Statements 38-51).

In response to Special Interrogatories nos. 5-8, the jury
found that someone at Home learned of a dishonest act by Larry
Glad unrelated to the AFCO investor-loans in or about
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mid-December 1981.

Aetna now claims this discovery of an

unrelated dishonest act automatically terminated coverage as to
losses sustained several years later as a consequence of Larry
Glad's prior conduct with respect to the AFCO-investor loans.
Common sense dictates that it does not.

Moreover, resolving

this issue in Aetna's favor would require a factual finding as
to whether the discovery of the non-related dishonest act in
mid-December predated Larry Glad's dishonest conduct which
caused Home's losses at issue in this litigation.

Yet Aetna

never requested such a factual determination by the jury on
this issue.

Further, Aetna did not object to the special

interrogatories propounded to the jury or ask for clarification
with respect to this issue.

The evidence at trial demonstrated

that Glad's conduct with respect to the AFCO-investor loans
infected them from the very beginning, prior to mid-December
1981, and that virtually all the loans had been processed and
underwritten prior to Home's discovery of an unrelated
dishonest act.

(Trial Exh. 79, 383; Cox test., R. 2905.86).

This Court should not indulge Aetna's belated
trial-by-hindsight request.

5

This is particularly so because

Although the jury did not identify the act or who
discovered it, as Aetna suggested in closing argument (R.
2917.193), the incident likely refers to Glad's effort, about
mid-December, to convince a teller to issue a cashier's check
in exchange for a personal check. (Pewtress test., R.
2920.125-.128).
- 56 -

Aetna does not even argue that the jury's verdict is not
supported by substantial evidence of Glad's prior dishonesty
that caused Home's losses•

Indeed, the Trial Court commented

after trial that:
At the time of the discovery of his
dishonesty. Glad had already set in motion
the matters which ultimately resulted in the
losses sustained by Home, In the context of
such losses sustained well after the
consummation of the dishonest acts, and the
discovery of other dishonest acts referenced
in the jury's responses to Interrogatory
Nos. 5-8, it would be nonsensical to
discharge Aetna under Section 11 of the bond,
(R. 2079-80; emphasis added).

This court should likewise

reject Aetna's Section 11 argument and affirm the existence of
the fidelity coverage Aetna agreed to provide Home under the
Bond.
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POINT III.
AETNA MAY NOT USE THE JURY'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4 TO AVOID THE JUDGMENT.
Aetna seeks reversal of the Judgment entered in favor of
Home Savings based on the jury's answers to Special
Interrogatories nos. 2 and 4.

Aetna contends that

unintentional nondisclosure of material facts by Home/ in
connection with its Application for Bond coverage (Trial
Exhibit 122), makes its Bond Mvoid ab initio" and entitles it
to rescission*

(See Aetna's Answer to Amended Complaint,

Twelfth Defense, R. 44, 51). Although this Court need not even
address this defense for the reasons set forth below, it fails
because (1) Home answered the Application correctly and there
was no failure to disclose in response to questions in the
Application; and (2) Home had no duty to volunteer information
or judgments not requested.

Furthermore, the relief Aetna

seeks is not available as a matter of law, because Aetna never
clearly elected rescission nor tendered back to Home the
premiums it paid; and the jury's answers to the Special
Interrogatories relating to Aetna's rescission defense were
advisory and not binding on the Trial Court.

Thus, Aetna's

entire analysis on this point is purely academic.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AETNA'S RESCISSION DEFENSE
In its Answer dated May 29, 1986, Aetna asserted in its
Twelfth Defense that its Bond was void ab initio as a result of
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material misrepresentations and omissions by Home in connection
with its Application.

(R. 51). Home moved to strike this

defense (R. 237-239); and Aetna agreed to withdraw it (R.
651-57).

When Aetna then refused to formally withdraw it, Home

requested Aetna admit that the defense failed as a matter of
law.

In response, Aetna this time withdrew the defense.

(R. 666). Subsequently, just before trial, the Court allowed
Aetna to withdraw its withdrawal and reassert its "Twelfth
Defense."

(R. 2912.129-.134).

Even so, Aetna neglected this

defense throughout the first three and one-half weeks of
trial , until at the last possible moment Aetna called, over
Home's objection, a surprise, previously undesignated witness David Robinson, one of Aetna's underwriters, to testify on this
issue.

(R. 2916.28)

As Judge Murphy explained in a twenty-three page post-trial
Memorandum Decision, because Aetna did not focus on this
defense until the very last days of trial, he was not able to
take as studied an approach as he would have liked.
(Memorandum Decision, R. 2058, 2066).

Therefore, he cautiously

"chose to submit to the jury every possible factual issue and
to sort through the results following trial."

6

It was not until Nov. 20 that
on the issue, which the Court had
R. 2919.194-.196); 2923.217-.218;
Oct. 27.
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(R. 2066).

Aetna submitted a memorandum
requested before trial (see
2918.86). The trial began
-

Judge Murphy did this by drafting his own special
interrogatories/ separate and apart from the Special Verdict
submitted to the jury on Home's legal claims against Aetna.
Judge Murphy explained/ however/ that the circumstances under
which the Bond would be invalidated would be determined by the
Court.

(Id./ R. 2917.62).

After hearing all the evidence and studying the transcripts
of the witnesses' trial testimony/ the Trial Court found that
there was no evidence that Home omitted facts requested by the
Application.

It therefore disregarded the jury's answer to

Special Interrogatory no. 2.
2067-2071; Order, R. 2434).

(Memorandum Decision, R. 2058/
The Trial Court added that/ had it

had the time to deliberate/ it# in retrospect/ would not have
submitted Special Interrogatory no. 2 to the jury.
2071).

(id./ R.

Similarly/ after reviewing transcripts and the law, the

Trial Court ruled that Home had no duty to volunteer
information outside the Application, and concluded that the
jury's answer to Interrogatory no. 4 could provide no legal
basis for rescinding the Bond.
A.

(Id.# R. 2077)

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT HOME FAILED TO DISCLOSE
INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE APPLICATION.

Former Utah Code § 31-19-8 enumerates the circumstances
under which an insurance policy may be avoided because of
"misrepresentations/ omissions, concealment of facts, and
incorrect statements" in an application for insurance.
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As

Aetna correctly points out, an alleged misrepresentation,
omission, etc. need not be made with intent to defraud or
mislead.

Aetna fails to mention, however, that the alleged

misrepresentation, omission, etc. must be in response to a
question asked in the application, a condition that literally
negates Aetna's entire analysis.

Wardle v. International

Health & Life Insurance Co.. 551 P.2d 623, 628 (Idaho 1976);
Roess v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 383 F.Supp. 1231,
1236 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (interp. Fla. stat.)(both cases
interpreting statutes virtually identical to Utah's former
Section 31-19-8).

If the insurer does not inquire, then

Section 31-19-8 simply has no application.
In response to Special Interrogatory no. 2, the jury
concluded that Home unintentionally failed to disclose material
facts in connection with the Application which Home completed
June 16, 1982. All of the evidence which arguably would
support this conclusion, marshalled by Aetna in its Brief at
page 47, consists of testimony by Aetna's underwriter, David
Robinson, and its agent, Don Bradshaw.

Yet, as Judge Murphy

found after "cautiously" reviewing this testimony, none of the
evidence speaks directly to the key issue of what information
was required in response to the Application.

(Memorandum

Decision, R. 2069-70).
This is especially so in the case of Robinson, where all
his testimony regarding allegedly material nondisclosures
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concerned information about which Aetna simply made no
inquiry,

Robinson, for example, admitted that Aetna did not

ask about pending litigation in the Application, though it has
since added such a question (R. 2916.43-.45) and that the
Application asked only about current policies, in effect in
June, 1982, and current employees; not past policies nor former
employees.

(Robinson, R. 2916.41-.42,-.48; Memorandum D e c , R.

2058, 2070; Application, Trial Exh. 122). See U.S. Fidelity St
Guaranty Co. v. Empire State Bank, 448 F.2d 360, 366 (8th Cir.
1971) (Bank not required to disclose suspicions about former
employees on bond application, where not asked about former
employees).

Robinson also acknowledged there was nothing in

the Application that would have suggested to Home that it
should have volunteered information not asked.

(R.

2916.42,-.50-.51).
The closest Aetna can come to making an argument is
Question no. 17 in the Application, which asked:
M

List on page 4 all losses sustained by
date, type and amount, whether reimbursed or
not, during the last six years. If none, so
state." [Emphasis added].
Home responded,
"None over deductible amount."
(Emphasis added).

A M yes H answer to Question no. 17 would have

directed Home's attention to page 4, on which appeared a chart
entitled "Six-Year Loss Information from
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to

."

The

fourth column on page 4 of the chart inquired about the "amount
of loss pending."

Question 17/ however, did not call for any

information which Home failed to disclose.
First, Home's response to Question no. 17 was factually
correct.

As even Aetna acknowledges. Home did not sustain a

loss on the AFCO-investor loans until well after June, 1982
(Aetna Brief, Fact Statement no. 16, p. 18; also p. 59). There
was no evidence that Home had sustained any losses on any other
loans or losses of any other nature, greater than the Aetna
Bond's $5,000 deductible in the six years prior to June 16,
1982.

Don Bradshaw, Aetna's agent, further added that just the

fact of a lawsuit, "by a disgruntled borrower" for example,
"doesn't create a loss."

(R. 2916.59).

Stretching to find something in the record that conceivably
could constitute a nondisclosure in response to Question no.
17, Aetna asserts that "Home was already booking and
experiencing losses related to the loans . . .."
p. 54 - no citation to the record).

(Aetna Brief,

Yet, as previously noted,

Home had sustained no loss on the AFCO-investor loans as of
June, 1982.

In fact, Home "booked" those loans as losses only

after the Armitage jury returned its adverse verdict in late
1984.

(Shaw, R. 2916.202).

Until the Armitage verdict, Home

reasonably expected repayment of its fully secured mortgage
loans.

Home had, however, pursuant to federal regulations,
- 63 -

begun to establish a reserve for uncollected interest

so

that such accrued interest would not be treated as income.
(Smolka, R. 2917.28, 2916.133,-.145-.147). If Home's method of
accounting for delinquent interest is what Aetna wanted from
Home, it could and should have posed a question reasonably
designed to elicit such information.
Health & Life Ins. Co.. supra at 626.

Wardle v. International
Even Aetna's own agent,

Don Bradshaw, testified that the mere establishment of a
reserve for uncollected interest would not have deterred him
Q

from taking Home's Application.

(R. 2916.69-.70).

Furthermore, the chart on page 4 provides no help to
Aetna.

Assuming Question no. 17 was answered correctly, Home -

following Aetna's instructions - would not have reached page
4.

Page 4, furthermore, is merely a continuation of Question

17, asking for additional detail - over a six-year history - of
"losses sustained."

A cursory examination of the Application,

including the chart, shows that it was designed to elicit
7

Significantly, however, the Aetna Bond excludes from
fidelity coverage uncollected interest on loans. See Rider
6041 (If 2(i)).

8

In response to Aetna's "hypothetical," which was
unsupported by evidence, Bradshaw conceded that if., in addition
to the reserve for uncollected interest, Home had already
decided that it "was going to make a claim related to
dishonesty on the bond," then he would not have submitted the
Application. (R. 2916.70-.71). The jury, however, concluded
that any nondisclosure by Home was unintentional.
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information about events that had already triggered a "loss" by
any common sense definition.

"Loss sustained," "date/"

"amount," are all concepts used to get at something that has
clearly happened and is identifiable both mathematically and by
time.
In its Brief, Aetna disingenuinely never even mentions the
actual terms used in its Application.
III).

(See Aetna Brief, Point

Rather, it substitutes new terms, "possible claim,"

••potential claim," and "potential loss" (Id., pp. 47, 52),
which are entirely different legal concepts from "loss
sustained."

Aetna seems to base its entire legal argument on

these contingent concepts, which are nowhere found in the
Application.

Aetna, in hindsight, now asserts that Home should

have guessed that this was the information Aetna really desired
and engaged a staff of lawyers and actuaries to divine the
certainty of an adverse judgment which was not yet rendered
and, as Aetna admits, did not result in a loss until three and
one-half years later. (Aetna Brief, pp. 18, 59). No
responsible institution would ever classify pending or
threatened litigation as a "loss sustained."

The Application

does not request "potential claims" or "potential losses,"
opinions, judgments or speculation about future events.

Had

Aetna truly desired such information, it need only have asked
Home simple, specific questions, such as "is there any existing
or threatened litigation?"

(See Memorandum Decision, R.
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2078).

Yet it failed to do so.

Home should not be blamed for

and suffer the consequences of Aetna's failure to inquire.

See

2 Couch on Insurance 2d § 15.90, supra; see Analysis (ambiguity
in applications for insurance), supra at 34.
Finally, even if it could be argued that Home should
somehow have divined what Aetna really wanted, Robinson never
testified that Aetna would not have issued the bond or would
have excluded the risk.

(Memorandum D e c , R. 2069-70).

Similarly, there was no evidence that Aetna would have made
further inquiry had Home's answer to Question No. 17 been
different.

(Id., R. 2070-2071).

Having "closely reviewed the

Bradshaw and Robinson transcripts," Judge Murphy concluded:
[T]here was no evidentiary basis for the
jury to determine that Aetna would not have
issued the bond or would have excluded the
risk if Home had responded affirmatively to
Question 17 in accordance with the
information it had on June 16, 1982.
(Id., R. 2070).
B.

HOME HAD NO DUTY TO VOLUNTEER INFORMATION NOT
REQUESTED.

In responding to Interrogatory no. 4 the jury concluded
that Home unintentionally failed to disclose facts beyond those
required in response to the Application questionnaire.

Because

there is no duty to volunteer information not requested, the
Trial Court held that the jury's answer to Interrogatory No. 4
afforded no basis for Aetna to rescind its Bond or otherwise
avoid coverage.

(Memorandum Decision, R. 2058, 2071-2079).
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In cases of nonmarine insurance, the prevailing American

[I]f the insurer propounds questions to the
applicant and he makes full and true
answers, the applicant is not answerable for
an omission to mention the existence of
other facts about which no inquiry is made
of him, although they may turn out to be
material for the insurer to know in taking
the risk.
43 Am.Jur.2d. Insurance §§ 1008, 1005 (1982); accord, 9 Couch
on Insurance § 38.72 (2d ed. 1985); R. Keeton, Cases and
Material on Basic Insurance Law (1977) at 530.
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Howard, 67 F.2d
382 (5th Cir. 1933), petition for rehearing denied, 78 L.E.
1043, cert, denied 78 L.E. 1054 (1934), which involved a
fidelity bond, the surety defended on the basis that the
insured had failed to volunteer material information not
requested in the bond application.

The Court rejected the

surety's defense:
[T]he failure to disclose, in the absence of
questions calling for it, was not a breach
of the bond. [I]t would be a harsh and
unreasonable construction of the bond, and
contrary to the principles governing cases
of this kind, to hold it defeated by a
failure to furnish information not called
for.
67 F.2d at 383; see also State v. United Pacific Insurance Co.,
612 P.2d 809, 811 (Wash. App. 1980) (also a fidelity bond case)
("failure to provide information not requested by the insurer
would not vitiate the contract").
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The majority view set forth above, which Aetna conveniently
fails to mention, is reiterated in numerous cases involving
other types of insurance.

See Federal Insurance Co. v. Oak

Industries. Fed. Sec. Rptr. H 92, 519 (S.D. Cal. 1986; Civil
No. 85-985-G(M)) (directors and officers liability policy),
USLife Credit Life Insurance Co. v. McAfee. 630 P.2d 450, 453
(Wash. App. 1981) (health insurance); Georgia Farm Bureau
Insurance Co. v. First Federal Savings & Loan of Statesboro.
262 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. App. 1979) (fire insurance); Van Winkle v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co.. 697 P.2d 784, 786 (Colo. App.
1984) (title insurance); Dinnerman v. Boston Ins. Co. 181 Misc.
703, 42 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1943) (fire insurance); accord Wootton v.
Combined Ins. Co. of America. 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724
(1964) (failure of an applicant for insurance to "volunteer"
information not requested on an application form does not avoid
g
coverage.)

9

It is well settled that if an insurer, with all its data
bases, resources and expertise, does not deem it necessary to
inquire about certain information in the application
questionnaire it composes, then the information not inquired
into is presummed to be immaterial. Roess v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co.. 383 F.Supp. 1231, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 1974)
(interpreting Florida statute substantially similar to Utah's
former Section 31-19-8); see also. 9 Couch on Insurance 2d
§ 38.72 (1968) (insured is entitled to presume that an
insurance application asks all questions relevant to the
insurer's decision to issue a policy); 43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance
§ 1007, at 1014 (1982); USLife Credit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee.
supra at 453; Treit v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co.. 499 P.2d
335, 338 (Ore. App. 1972); Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.. 72 L.Ed. 895, 898 (1928); Ellis v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co.
of Detroit. Mich., 27 F.2d 544, 546 (S.D. Tex. 1928).
- 68 -

Nonetheless, Aetna seeks to impose on Home a duty to
volunteer, citing Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 564, 447 P.2d 956 (Cal. 1968); Phoenix Sav. & Loan, Inc.
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 266 F.Supp. 465 (D. Md. 1966)
rev'd., 381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1967); West American Fin. Co. v.
Pacific Indemnity Co., 61 P.2d 963 (Cal. App. 1936).

These

authorities and those they rely upon were analyzed and rejected
by the Trial Court (Memorandum D e c , R. 2058, 2072-2076), which
found significant the fact that "none of the decisions
discussed inquires made by the insurer in the application
process."

Morever, those authorities, particularly Sumitomo

Bank, fail to acknowledge, much less analyze, the modern cases
that refuse to impose a duty to volunteer on an insured.
The law should not impose a duty of clairvoyance on an
applicant for insurance. USLife Credit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee,
supra at 455.

The undesirability of such a law and policy was

explained by Trial Court in this case, which held:
[T]he courts should not impose a rule
requiring the insured be expert in risk
assumption. The latter is the area of
expertise of the insurer. . . . one
situated as Home cannot be expected to
determine what is material and what is not
material to the vast subject matter
underlying the particular risks assumed.
The insurer, as the beneficiary of any duty
imposed on the insured, should realize the
insured's focus is on its immediate business
and industry. The insured's focus is not on
deliberating about the materiality or
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immateriality to an insured risk of a vast
amount of historical and current business
information. Consequently, even if the
insured is highly sophisticated and has some
knowledge of risk assumption, it cannot be
expected to have its attention focused on
that about which it is not asked on an
insurance application questionnaire.
The court is persuaded that concerning
subjects not probed in the application
questionnaire, the insured does not have a
duty to volunteer information . . .
(Memorandum Dec., R. 2077).
C.

AETNA'S FAILURE TO TENDER PREMIUMS BACK TO HOME
PRECLUDES RESCISSION.

Aetna may not now claim that its Bond is Mvoid ab initio"
because it never unequivocally elected to rescind the Bond,
never tendered back to Home the premiums paid, but instead,
chose to defend on the policy.
"Rescission" is not just the termination of a contractual
obligation.

Rather, it is the "abrogation or undoing of [a

contract] at the beginning, which seeks to create a situation
the same as if no contract had ever existed."

Glockel v. State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 400 N.W.2d 250 (Neb.

10

The Court did not rule on this argument, which Home
briefed and argued below. (R. 1500, 1506-1510; 2918.58-.61).
However, this Court can affirm the Trial Court's decision on
legal grounds not ruled on below, where it is proper under the
law to do so. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d
892, 895 (Utah 1988); Tavlor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163,
170 n.10 (Utah App. 1989).
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1987).

An insurer is precluded from asserting rescission

where, after having acquired knowledge of facts justifying
rescission, it retains the unearned portion of the premium or
fails to return or tender it back with reasonable promptness.
Dairvland Ins. Co. v. Kammerer, 327 N.W.2d 618 (Neb. 1982);
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Anava. 428 P.2d 640, 645
(N.M. 1967); 3A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 1832
(1967); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 716 at 698 (1946).

If a party

elects to rescind a contract, it must act promptly and
unequivocally.

Perry v. Woodall. 438 P.2d 813 (Utah 1968);

accord. Verex Assurance. Inc. v. John Hanson Sav. & Loan. 816
F.2d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1987).

Thus, in Dairvland. the

Nebraska Supreme Court held:
When learning of the alleged fraud.
Auto-Owners [the insurer! had two choices.
Either it could determine that, because of
the alleged fraudulent statements made to
it. it wished to cancel the policy from its
inception and return to Popish [the insured]
the entire premium, on the theory that the
policy never came into existence, or it
could waive the alleged fraud, keep the
premium earned to date of cancellation, and
accept responsibility under the policy. . .
TBly its retention of a portion of the
premium. Auto-Owners elected to recognize
the existence of the policy from the date of
its issuance. . . Having made that choice.
Auto-Owners could not, on the one hand,
recognize the existence of the policy and
retain a portion of the premium and, on the
other hand, deny the coverage afforded by
the policy because of alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation.
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Dairyland, supra, at 620 (emphasis added); see also 44
Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 1649 at 647 (1982).
Utah law imposes this same choice on insurers:
One who claims a right of recission must act
with reasonable promptness [* * *] [A
defendant insurance company] cannot treat
the policy as void for the purpose of
defense to an action to recover for a loss
thereafter occurring, and at the same time
treat it as valid for the purpose of earning
and collecting further premiums.
Farrinaton v. Granite States Fire Ins. Co. of Portsmouth, 232
P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1951) (quoting 25 Am.Jur. 653). One who
wishes to claim that a contract was void .at) initio must tender
back to the other contracting party the consideration it
received.

Perry v. Woodall, supra at 815.

results in loss of the right to rescind.

Failure to do so

Id. at 815.

Aetna never clearly elected rescission.

It acknowledged

that it never tendered back to Home the premiums Home paid
Aetna to purchase the Bond.

(R. 2918.85-.86).

As in Dairyland

and the authorities cited above, Aetna has lost this defense.
It would be fundamentally unfair to allow Aetna to watch the
events of the last seven and one-half years unfold, retain the
benefits of the Bond and then later claim the right to rescind
it.

See McLane v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 432 P.2d 98

(Mont. 1967) (Montana's rescission statute - rescission not
available where insurer continued to accept premiums after
acquiring knowledge of its right to rescind).
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Having kept the

premiums, having defended on the basis of the Bond's
provisions/ Aetna should not be heard to argue that its Bond
was void from its inception.
When confronted below with its failure to tender, Aetna
argued that Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co,, 723 P.2d
388 (Utah 1986)/ says nothing about tender of premiums as a
prerequisite to rescission.

Berger does not mention necessity

of tender because the question of tender was not in issue
there.

Indeed/ unlike Aetna, Minnesota Mutual immediately

tendered back to the insured the premium he had paid.

See

Minnesota Mutual's Answer, Third Defense (R. 3549/ 3553).
Aetna also argued that coverage may be avoided under Utah
Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (since repealed) without electing
rescission.

(R. 1672# 1679-1682).

This argument ignores that

the term rescission is used in § 31-19-8 and that elsewhere it
has been described as a "rescission statute".

See State

Compensation Fund v. Mar Pac Helicopter Corp, 752 P.2d 1, 5
(Ariz. App. 1987) (interp. A.R.S. § 20-1109).

While Section

31-19-8 may allow an insurer to avoid its contractual
obligations under certain circumstances/ it does not alter the
mechanics of doing so or change the well-settled law of
rescission.
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D.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS FREE TO DISREGARD THE JURY'S
ADVISORY FINDINGS ON INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4.

Aetna and Home entered into a contract whereby Aetna agreed
to indemnify Home for certain losses.

In asserting in its

Answer that the Bond was void ah initio, Aetna sought to
rescind its contract.

As the Utah Supreme Court recently held

in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987), an action
for rescission is a claim for equitable relief.

Accordingly,

Aetna was not entitled to a jury trial on the issues
surrounding its claim of rescission.

Id. at n. 6.

In a

proceeding in equity, a jury fills only an advisory role.
Thus, a Trial Court is free to accept or reject the finding of
an advisory jury and the Trial Court's decision in that regard
is not subject to appellate review.

Romrell v. Zions First

National Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980) (trial judge may
of course completely reject the verdict of an advisory jury in
an equity case).
In this case, placed under a compaction of time, the severe
pressures of a long and drawn-out trial and the belated
assertion by Aetna of its rescission defense, the Court drafted
its own special interrogatories and chose to submit everything
to the jury and "sort it out later."

Thereafter, "without the

pressure of a jury waiting in the wings" and armed with actual
transcripts of "pertinent portions of the trial," the Court
considered Aetna's equitable defense in connection with Aetna's
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request for entry of judgment and Home's corresponding motion.
The Trial Court found that there were no misrepresentations or
omissions by Home of material facts requested by the
Application and disregarded the contrary advisory finding.

The

care with which the Court considered this issue, its fact
finding and reasoning are set forth in detail in its Memorandum
Decision.

(R. 2058/ 2066-2071).

The Trial Court's decision to

deny Aetna's request for equitable relief "follows logically
from and is supported by the evidence.
P.2d 423/ 426 (Utah 1986).

M

Smith v. Smith, 726

Aetna has not even suggested that

the Trial Court's findings were clearly erroneous.

See Utah R.

Civ. P. 52(a). -Aetna has no legal basis to challenge the
Court's rejection of its defense and refusal to fashion the
equitable relief it belatedly sought.
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POINT IV
AETNA MAY NOT USE THE TRADING EXCLUSION RIDER TO AVOID
PAYING HOME'S LOSSES.
Prior to trial, Aetna moved for summary judgment based upon
Bond Rider 6030a.

(R. 194-195)•

This rider purports to

exclude coverage which might otherwise obtain for "losses
resulting directly or indirectly from trading.-

After Judge

Murphy denied Aetna's motion, noting that Home's conduct "does
not necessarily equate to trading in securities as that term is
used in Rider SR 6030a" (Minute Entry, R. 329-332), Aetna
completely abandoned this defense.

Indeed, Aetna failed to

mention or preserve this defense in the Stipulated Pretrial
Order (R. 719-740); it put on no evidence relevant to the issue
during the course of trial; and it proposed no Jury
Instructions or requests for findings in the Special Verdict
pertinent to the issue (R. 1180-1289).
Having consciously relinquished this purported affirmative
defense, Aetna incredibly requests a remand for a factual
determination "of that portion of Home Savings' losses in the
Armitaoe judgment which derived from trading . . . " and a
proportionate reduction of Home's damages.

(Brief, p. 61).

This relief is simply unavailable to Aetna.
A.

AETNA HAS WAIVED THE TRADING EXCLUSION DEFENSE AND ANY
ALLEGED ERROR RELATING TO ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

Although Aetna's "trading exclusion" argument is in the
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nature of an affirmative defense, Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); Pratt
v. Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977), Aetna
failed to raise it in its Answer.

(R. 44-53).

Nevertheless,

Aetna moved for summary judgment based on this exclusion.
194-195).

(R.

Home could have objected to the motion, but instead

addressed its lack of merit.

(R. 287-288.23, 2912.61-.66).

Based on the record then before it, the Court denied Aetna's
motion (Minute Entry, R. 329-332); it did not, however,
preclude Aetna from reasserting the defense in the pretrial
order or from introducing evidence on the issue at trial.

(R.

329, 331).
After the Court denied Aetna's motion, Aetna stipulated to
a pretrial order.

In the Stipulated Pretrial Order, Aetna set

forth its theory of the case and reserved certain defenses to
Home's claims.

(R. 719-740).

Nowhere in the Pretrial Order or

elsewhere did Aetna preserve the "trading exclusion" defense.
Once a pretrial order is signed and entered, it thereafter
limits and controls the issues in the litigation.

Citizens

Casualty Co. of New York v. Hackett, 410 P.2d 767, 768 (Utah
1966).

Issues not retained in the pretrial order are

eliminated from the action.

Baxter v. Utah Dept. of

Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045, 1047 n. 2 (Utah App. 1989);
Pierce County Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Health
Trust v. Elks Lodge, B.P.O.E. NO. 1450, 827 F.2d 1324, 1329
(9th Cir. 1987).

Aetna's failure to include this issue in the
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pretrial order effects a waiver of the issue and it is
irrelevant that the issue may have been debated or discussed
prior to entry of the pretrial order.

Southern California

Retail Clerks Union and Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund
v, Biorklund, 728 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1984); accord,
Rumsev v. Salt Lake City. 400 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1965)
(affirmative defense abandoned at pretrial hearing).,
Moreover, the relief which Aetna seeks on appeal is remand
for a factual determination as to what HportionM of Home's
losses resulted from -trading- and a corresponding
••proportionate" reduction in damages.

(Aetna Brief, p. 61).

Interestingly, this is not the relief Aetna sought when it
moved for summary judgment.

(R. 194-195, 210-210.87).

Thereafter, Aetna abandoned the defense.

No evidence was ever

presented to the Court, or to the jury, that would support the
relief Aetna now seeks. As this Court recently held in Barker
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553-54 (Utah App. 1987), where a
party fails to present evidence on an issue at trial he may not
obtain a remand to later allow him to present such evidence.
Thus, where, as here, no evidence was presented or findings
requested, remand for a factual determination as to whether
certain of Home's losses resulted from -trading- is both
unwarranted and unavailable.

11

Aetna, by its motion, sought to exclude the entirety of
Home Savings' loss from coverage. There was no request for a
-proportionate reduction-.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED AETNA'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

Home agrees that the trading loss exclusion was meant to
exclude losses caused by trading in securities.

However, there

is no evidence that Aetna can point to in the record, in
connection with its motion for summary judgment or otherwise,
that Home was involved in "trading," as that term is defined
with respect to securities or as it is vaguely used in Rider
6030a.
The wording of the "trading exclusion" rider, as used in
Bankers1 and Savings & Loans' Blanket Bonds, was borrowed from
the standard Brokers' Blanket Bond.

Shearson/American Express

v. First Continental Bank & Trust, 579 F.Supp. 1305, 1310 (W.D.
Mo. 1984).

In the securities industry, "trading" denotes

carrying out transactions of buying or selling stocks, bonds or
commodity futures contracts.

Downes, Barron's Dictionary of

Finance and Investment Terms (1985) at 439.

It is this type of

activity, new to the highly regulated banking industry, that
the imported rider intended to exclude from coverage. 12

12

According to one source, the addition of the "trading
exclusion" rider to the Standard Bankers Blanket Bond was
prompted in the mid-1970's by "unprecedented bank activity in
the area of foreign exchange trading" and "the large amounts of
funds involved" therein. Thus, effective 1976, the "trading"
exclusion from the Standard Stockbrokers Blanket Bond was
inserted into the Standard Bankers Blanket Bond, with a
buy-back option exercisable by institutions engaged in such
trading activity. R. Weldy, "A Survey of Recent Changes in
Financial Institution Bonds," Forum at 270 (Fall, 1976).
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Shearson/American Express, supra; Aetna Brief, p.58.

Yet, as

Judge Kane, the trial judge in Armitaae explained, "This action
arose from the fraudulent business activities of three Afco
corporations and their president • . .

.

Investors were

beguiled into taking out second mortgages on their homes in
order to purchase worthless securities from Afco and Affleck."
City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Home, 631 F. Supp. 1050,
1051-52 (D. Utah 1986) (emphasis added) (also R. 2800-2822).
The Armitaqe jury was instructed that promissory notes given by
AFCO to the Armitage plaintiffs/AFCO-investors were, as a
matter of law, securities.

Armitaae Jury Instruction No. 5.03

(R. 288.12). . However, there was no such instruction and no
such finding with respect to the second mortgage loans that
originated at Home Savings.

Judge Kane, in fact, instructed

the jury that the notes and loan documents executed by the
borrowers in favor of Home Savings, as a matter of law, were
not securities.

Armitaae Jury Instruction 5.03 (R. 288.12).

Thus, while Home's participation, through the involvement of
its loan officer Larry Glad, see Armitaae Jury Instruction
10.08 (R. 288.13), resulted in the Jury finding violations of
certain securities laws, there was no finding in Armitaae that

- 80 -

Home Savings was "trading- in securities.

13

On the contrary,

Home Savings was engaged in the same business it had conducted
since its inception, making mortgage loans to homeowners.
Accordingly, after carefully considering Aetna's motion and
memorandum, together with the instructions given in Armitage
and the outcome of the Armitage lawsuit, Judge Murphy denied
Aetna's motion for summary judgment.

The Court's analytical

opinion reasoned:
. . .Defendant's position is necessarily and
expressly that plaintiff's alleged loss
arises out of the judgment in Armitage, et
al v. Home Savings and Loan Association,
which was based on a jury finding against
Home for fraud "involved in the sale or
exchange of securities." The nature of the
evidence, jury instructions and verdict in
Armitage necessarily requires the
nomenclature "involved in the sale or
exchange of securities" to characterize
Home's conduct and the jury's findings.
Such "involvement," however, does not
necessarily equate to "trading" in
securities as that term is used in rider SR
6030a.

13 Aetna's reliance on the Armitage verdict and judgment
impermissibly short-cuts the requirements necessary to
establish collateral estoppel. To establish issue preclusion
requires, first, that the factual issue decided in the prior
adjudication be identical in all respects with the one
presented in the action in question. Copper State Thrift &
Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah App. 1987); Searle
Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). Yet, the
factual issues of whether Home engaged in "trading" as that
term is used in Rider 6030a, and whether Home sustained a loss
caused by "trading" were never determined in Armitage. Judge
Murphy implicitly noted this distinction in his order denying
Aetna's motion for summary judgment. (R. 329-332).
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The jury's affirmative answer to question
A.l. in the verdict form necessarilyrequired
a finding that Home offered or sold a
security. Jury instruction 6.03, however,
required such a finding if Home's
"assistance was a substantial motivating
factor in causing the sale of a
security..." Such a finding is not
necessarily the eguivalent of a finding that
Home or any employee was "trading" in
securities. These same concepts apply to
the jury finding under Section
61-1-22(1)(a), Utah Code Ann., pursuant to
jury instruction Nos. 8.01, 8.02, 8.03, 8.07
and 8.08, and recorded in response to
question C.l. in the verdict form. Under
these particular securities claims, if Home
facilitated the sale of a security, it was
itself a seller. Facilitation of a sale may
constitute a sale under various securities
statutes, but it does not necessarily
constitute trading in securities as that
term is used in rider SR 6030a.
The Jury finding of primary liability under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5
did not require a finding that Home was a
seller of a security. This finding was
premised on an inherent finding of the
proscribed acts "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." Such a
finding is not necessarily the equivalent of
a finding that Home traded securities.
The undisputed facts submitted in support of
defendant's motion establish that trading in
securities, if any, occurred at the level
between AFCO and the investor. These same
facts do not, however, establish as a matter
of law that Home was trading in securities.
14
(Minute Entry, R. 329-331) (emphasis added).

14

Judge Murphy also found the exclusion's term "trading,"
as used in Rider 6030a, to be ambiguous. (R. 331). The
ambiguity, therefore, must be strictly construed against Aetna,
in favor of coverage.
- 82 -

Aetna's simplistic conclusion that any securities fraud
judgment against Home could not have been entered without a
finding of -trading- is contrary to both the evidence (or lack
thereof) and the law.

In fact, Aetna presented no evidence

that Home Savings was engaged in -trading-; and -trading- is
not a specific element of any of the securities claims made in
Armitage.

Aetna's interpretation could, in practice, exclude

from coverage losses on any loan that involved fraud or
dishonesty, if made to a borrower who then invested, with the
bank's knowledge, the proceeds of that loan in a -security," as
that term is broadly construed under various state and federal
securities laws.
Indeed, Aetna's contention that any securities context will
invoke the trading exclusion has been specifically rejected.
In Index Fund, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 580
F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1978), cert, denied 440 U.S. 912 (1979)
(involving a fidelity bond), INA sought to exclude coverage for
losses caused by the plaintiff's president, who was bribed to
purchase and sell securities on behalf of his corporation at
inflated prices.

In Index Fund, the jury was instructed that

if it found that the losses were caused by fraudulent or
dishonest acts which did not result from trading, that it must
determine the amount of Index Fund's loss.

Unlike the present

case, in Index Fund the jury actually made such a factual
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finding.

However, the Trial Court entered judgment

notwithstanding the jury's verdict for INA.

On appeal, the

Second Circuit, in overruling the Trial Court's Judgment
N.O.V., noted "where, as here, the obligee is a regulated
investment company, rather than a broker, fraudulent purchases
of securities for the company by the covered employee at a
manipulated price may well be considered outside the
contemplated meaning of 'trading'."

Id. at 1162 (emphasis

added).
Even more recently, in Insurance Company of North America
v. Gibralco, Inc., 847 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth
Circuit held that a trading loss exclusion similar to the
instant one was inapplicable, despite trading at some point in
furtherance of an employee's scheme to embezzle and steal
bonds.

The insurer, again INA, argued that if trading occurred

at any point in furtherance of the employee's scheme, then the
trading loss exclusion precluded coverage.

In rejecting this

argument, the court explained:
"Trading losses are generally understood to
be market losses sustained by firms as a
result of ill-advised, unauthorized, or
simply unlucky trading decisions made in the
purchasing, selling, or trading in
securities . . .
* * * * *

We do not agree with INA that the trading
loss exclusion precludes coverage if a trade
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occurs anywhere in the chain of events
resulting in a loss to the insured. The
broad applicability of the trading loss
exclusion urged by INA would eviscerate the
employee dishonesty coverage provisions of
the Bond in every case where trade might
occur in the course of an employee's
dishonest scheme.
Id. at 533.
Because the loss in Gibralco was caused by dishonesty and
fraudulent conduct/ as is the case here, as opposed to trading,
the Court of Appeals directed that judgment be entered against
INA. 15 This same result should obtain with respect to Home's
losses caused by the dishonest and fraudulent acts of Larry
Glad.
The Trial Court properly rejected Aetna's "trading"
argument/ as presented on Aetna's motion for summary judgment.

15

Like Judge Murphy, the Gibralco Court further found that
the language of the trading loss exclusion was ambiguous: ("the
Bond was ambiguous with respect to losses involving both
trading and employee dishonesty."). 847 F.2d at 533-34. As in
Gibralco, this provision should be construed against the
insurer and in favor of coverage.

- 85 -

POINT V.
NO BASIS EXISTS FOR AETNA'S CLAIMS THAT THE JURY WAS
IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED AND THAT AETNA WAS PREJUDICED IN
SUBMITTING ITS THEORY OF THE CASE.
In Point V of its Brief, Aetna complains that the Court
misled and confused the jury by the instructions on causation
and the Special Verdict form submitted to the jury.

Seeking a

retrial, Aetna claims it somehow was not permitted to argue its
theory of the case.
must establish:

For Aetna to prevail on this issue, it

(1) that it properly preserved the objections

raised on appeal; (2) that the objections raised are in accord
with the law; and (3) that any error prejudiced Aetna.

As set:

forth below, Aetna cannot meet its burden.
A.

AETNA HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY PRESERVED THE ALLEGED ERROR.

Aetna asserts that the Court erred: (1) by refusing to read
"a number of key instructions"; (2) by giving jury instructions
••that inaccurately presented Aetna's defense"; (3) by refusing
to submit to the jury a single special verdict question; and
(4) by submitting to the jury a special verdict form which
"failed to mention Home Savings* officers' and directors'
actions as being a possible cause of Home Savings' loss."
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, "No
party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto."
object is deemed a waiver on appeal.
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Thus, failure to

VanDyke v. Mountain Coin

Machine Distributors, 758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah App. 1988).
Furthermore, "a party must state distinctly the matter to which
he objects and the grounds for his objection."
51.

Utah R. Civ. P.

The grounds stated as the basis for an objection must be

specific enough to give the Trial Court an opportunity to
correct the error, if appropriate, and must alert the Court to
the very objection that is later made the basis for appeal.
Id.; Employers1 Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 258
P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1953).
be considered on appeal.

Otherwise, the objection will not
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake

Citv v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974).
(1) Aetna's proposed instructions.
The "number of key instructions" requested by Aetna that
the Court, over Aetna's objection, refused to give were just
two (R. 2917.59, 2917.63-.64).

The first, proposed Instruction

No. 2 (R. 1227), stated in relevant part:
. . . .If you find that the losses sustained
by Home Savings were solely and proximately
caused by Home Savings' own mismanagement,
misfeasance or other negligence and/or
failure to follow safe and sound lending
practices, then you must find there is no
coverage for Home Savings under the bond.
Aetna's stated ground for giving this instruction was
unintelligible.

The entire stated basis was:

MR. DAVIES: All right. First of all, our
defense that pertains to mismanagement as we
have discussed before, we have objected of
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course to the refusal to give requested
Instruction number two,
(R. 2917.59).

This objection patently fails the specificity

test established by Rule 51. Thus, the objection, whatever it
was, has been waived.
Aetna's proposed Instruction No. 42 (R. 1196) addressed the
possibility of concurrent causes, and sought to instruct the
jury that if it found certain of Home Savings' conduct to be "a
primary contributing cause to" Home's loss, then the loss could
not have been caused by Glad's dishonest acts.

Because the

Court asked for clarification of Instruction No. 42, there is
somewhat more of an explanation on the record.

(R. 2917.63).

However, the explanation offered does not correspond to the
language of the requested instruction or the alleged error.
MR. DAVIES: . . . And finally, on the
court's refusal to give instruction number
forty-two regarding causation, that was our
causation defense, and I think that's been
argued before.
THE COURT:

You mean that

MR. DAVIES: That Home Savings'
mismanagement and other improper decisions
and conduct could be a separate cause —
THE COURT: Measured by the same standard of
proof, that is, a preponderance, and not
requiring you to show fraud or bad faith?
MR. DAVIES: That would be our position.
That's correct, Your Honor. And we only
request preponderance.
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(R. 2917.63-.64; emphasis added).

The objection urges that

Home's alleged mismanagement could be a "separate cause" of its
loss.

The proposed Instruction, on the other hand/ speaks of

"primary contributing cause/ not "separate cause/" as Aetna's
counsel explained.

The two are different concepts.

If the

objection was intended to be that a "primary contributing
cause," whatever that is, breaks the chain of causation, then
the basis for the instruction was not made known to the Court.
Where the ground stated does not draw attention to the alleged
error claimed on appeal/ as was the case here, then the alleged
error is not preserved for appeal.

VanDyke v. Mountain Coin

Machine Distributors, supra at 964; Employers' Mutual Liability
Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., supra at 450.
More importantly, neither proposed instruction addresses
the alleged error Aetna now raises on appeal:

that the jury

was not permitted to "apportion fault" between competing causes
(Glad's dishonesty versus Home Savings' alleged
mismanagement).

Aetna proposed an erroneous comparative fault

instruction (see Aetna's proposed Instruction no. 3, R. 1224,
1228)/ which the Court correctly declined to give.
not object.

Aetna did

Consequently/ the very issue which Aetna asserts

as error was not preserved for appeal.
(2)

Jury Instructions 26-30.

Aetna also now complains that Instructions nos. 26/ 27, 28,
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29 and 30, "inaccurately presented [its] defense."

(Aetna

Brief, p. 69). Aetna, however, did not object to four of the
five instructions, nos. 26, 27, 28 or 30.

(R. 2917.58-.70).

Having not objected to these four instructions, Aetna waived
its right to now claim that they were given in error.

Van Dyke

v. Mountain Coin Machine Distributors, supra at 964.
(3) Absence of a single inquiry in the Special Verdict.
Aetna further asserts as error the Court's failure to
submit a Special Verdict form to the jury with the question:
6.

Did any loss sustained by Home Savings
directly result from the mismanagement,
misconduct, negligence, and/or failure
to follow safe and sound lending
practices?

Although Aetna originally submitted a form that contained
this question among others, that form was not used.
Thereafter, Aetna never objected to the absence of question no.
6 or one like it.

(See parties' objections, R. 2917.57-.70).

The special verdict form ultimately used was prepared by Aetna
(R. 1189, 1203-1206) and submitted by Aetna to the Trial Court
without a no. 6 like instruction.

In so doing and having not

objected to the Special Verdict form submitted to the jury,
Aetna waived its right to assert error on appeal.

Cambelt

Int'l. Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987).
(4)

The Court's use of the Special Verdict form (which
Aetna prepared.)

Finally, Aetna brands the form of Special Verdict that the
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Court used (R. 1290-1293) as "restrictive" and charges that it,
in combination with the Instructions, "confused" the jury.
(Aetna Brief, p. 72). Yet this was the very same form Aetna
submitted to and proposed that the Court use (see R. 1189,
1203-1206), except that the Court added a question on
mitigation of damages.

Aetna also neglects to inform the Court

that it failed to object to the alleged restrictiveness of
"its" form, or to the wording of any particular questions
contained therein.
been waived.
B.

By not objecting, any alleged error has

Cambelt Int'l. Corp. v. Dalton, supra.

THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY.

Aetna's indictment of the Court's handling of instructions
appears to be (1) that the jury should have been allowed to
speculate whether better policies and procedures, had they been
in place, might have checked Glad's dishonest conduct and thus
prevented Home's loss; and (2) that the instructions and
Special Verdict form should have permitted the jury to
"apportion" causation.
(1)

Negligence is not a defense to a fidelity bond claim.

Instruction no. 29, given to the jury, advised that:
. . . negligence resulting from the
existence of inadequate policies and
procedures at Home Savings, or the failure
to follow policies and procedures then in
place at Home Savings, is not a defense if
the conclusion drawn therefrom is that
better policies and procedures or adherence
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thereto would have checked the dishonesty,
if any, of Larry Glad and prevented a loss
that otherwise would have occurred.
(Quoted in part, R. 1330).
At page 70 of its Brief, Aetna challenges the Court's
decision to give Instruction No. 29 and asserts that the jury
should have been allowed to consider whether -better policies
and procedures thereto would have checked the dishonesty, if
any, of Larry Glad and prevented a loss that otherwise would
have occurred.**

Negligence, however, whether in the form of

failure to have in place better procedures, failure to follow
existing procedures, failure to adequately supervise employees,
negligence in hiring, or mismanagement in general, is not a
defense available to Aetna under its Bond.
Aetna's Bond, Rider 6041, provides simply that Aetna agrees
to indemnify an insured for "Loss resulting directly from one
or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee . . . "
Instruction no. 23 (R. 1324).

See

Aetna, in issuing its Bond, thus

undertook the obligation to indemnify Home against loss
resulting directly from the dishonesty of one or more of its
employees.

The consideration for undertaking this obligation

was the premium charged Home.
of Home.

Aetna required nothing further

It did not require as a condition precedent to

indemnification, for example, that Home adopt or follow any
particular procedure for processing and closing loans.
not require any special or particular supervision over
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It did

employees.

In contrast to some other types of insurance (e.g.,

legal malpractice policies), it did not require the institution
of or adherence to any particular internal quality - control
procedures.
Unless there exists a specific provision in a fidelity bond
to the contrary, negligence is not a defense to an insurer's
obligation under its bond.

13 Couch on Insurance 2d § 46.233

(1982); 10A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 801(b) (1946)
at 849; First Hayes Banshares, Inc. v. Kansas Bankers Surety
Co., 769 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Kan. 1989); Arlington Trust Co. v.
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 301 F.Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1969);
Main v. Benjamin Foster Co., 192 So. 602, 603-5 (Fla. 1939);
American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Cable, 108 F.2d 225, 227 (5th
Cir. 1939);

Maryland Casualty Co. v. American Trust Co., 71

F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1935)(Mconstant and sleepless
vigilence- by an employer to prevent loss to its insurer is not
part of the consideration extracted as a condition to the
insurer's obligation to indemnify loss caused by employee
dishonesty); Lassetter v. Becker, 224 P. 810, 812 (Ariz.
1924).

Thus,
[A surety is] not released from liability by
the want of even ordinary prudence on the
part of the insured in lessening the risk,
unless he expressly stipulate[s] therefor.

10A Appleman, supra § 6198 at 382.
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In Arlington Trust Co, v. Hawkeve-Security Ins, Co., supra,
for example, an insurer sought to escape liability under a
fidelity bond on the ground that its insured was
"contributorily negligent" in not adequately supervising a
particular (dishonest) employee and in not setting up proper
accounting and bookkeeping procedures.

The Court rejected the

insurer's defense:
The bank admittedly relied upon the
experience/ integrity and honesty of Mr.
Darcey in reporting his activities to the
Board of Directors and Executive Committee.
They set up no special procedures to check
or audit his work. Although the end result
proved them wrong in not doing so, it is not
enough to establish contributory negligence
on the part of the bank. Negligence on the
part of the bank/ if found to exist, is not
sufficient to defeat recovery under the
fidelity bond in question.
Id. at 858; see also Main v. Benjamin Foster Co., supra.
Instruction no. 29 was based on the above authorities and
correctly stated the law.
giving it.

Thus# the Court did not err in

In fact/ prior to trial/ Aetna acknowledged to the

Trial Court that negligence of an employer/ in failing to
reduce the risk of loss through better management/oversight
procedures, was not a defense.
(2)

(R. 517.4)

Apportionment based on comparative fault.

Aetna contends the jury should have been permitted "to
apportion cause between Larry Glad's dishonesty and Home's own
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mismanagement and bad business judgment."
72).

(Aetna Brief, p.

The argument, presumably, is that the jury should have

engaged in some sort of "comparative fault" analysis and that
the Court should have reduced Home's damages by the percentage
of fault attributed to its alleged mismanagement/bad business
judgment.
As a preliminary matter, Aetna, as noted above, has failed
to preserve this claimed error for review on appeal.

Moreover,

because negligence is not a defense, it cannot be the basis for
apportionment.

Under Rider 6041, the question of fact to be

determined by the jury is simply whether the employee's conduct
in any way brought about the loss.
A similar comparative-fault defense was rejected in State
v. United Pacific Ins. Co.. 612 P.2d 809, 811 (Wash. App.
1980).

The Trial Court had held that the insured was entitled

to indemnification for only half its loss, on the basis of
comparative negligence principles.

The Court of Appeals

reversed, holding that:
[W]e find no authority which would permit
the use of comparative negligence principles
to reduce the amount of recovery owing under
an insurance contract. Negligence is not
defense to an action on an indemnity bond
unless it amounts to fraud or bad faith. 10
J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice
§ 6198 (1943). The trial court erred in
reducing the judgment by 50 percent on the
theory that the School District contributed
to its own loss.
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For a fidelity insurer to avoid coverage on grounds of
negligence or Hmismanagement,M it should have to show that the
Insured's losses would have occurred notwithstanding the
employee's dishonest conduct.
Fund Ins. Co., supra at 860.

J.R. Norton Company v. Fireman's
Before trial, in response to

Home's motion in limine to exclude testimony directed at
negligence/mismanagement/ Aetna agreed:
Aetna is simply contending that the
mismanagement (negligent or otherwise) by
Home's officers and directors constitutes
wrongdoing quite independent of any action
taken by Mr. Glad, and that such
mismanagement (on the part of the officers
and directors) is the sufficient and sole
cause of the losses Home has sustained.
* * * * *

Aetna's claim is that the independent acts
of the Home officers and directors comprise
the sole sufficient cause of the loss
sustained by Home . . .
Aetna's Memorandum in Opposition to Home's Second Motion In
Limine.

(Emphases added; R. 517.l,-.3-.5).

This is, in fact,

precisely the standard the Court permitted Aetna to argue to
the jury, and which Aetna in fact argued.

16

Consistent with

Corbin indicates that where there exists multiple direct
causes of damages, the party experiencing damages is entitled
to his remedy under his contract, or damages for breach of his
contract. Thus, it is generally not proper to apportion
damages among contributing factors causing injury, 5 Corbin on
Contracts § 999 (1964).
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Aetna's pretrial acknowledgement, the jury was properly
instructed on the issue of causation.
Aetna now seeks some sort of apportionment, relying on
Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Corp., 440
F.Supp. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1977); aff'd, 647 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1981)/ a case involving an insuring clause not contained in the
Aetna Bond issued to Home Savings.

There, the insurer agreed

to indemnify the insured for loss of property through fraud or
dishonesty of any person, whether or not an employee of the
insured.

440 F.Supp. at 865.

The insureds had deposited funds

at another bank, San Francisco National Bank (MSFNBM), that
subsequently failed.

The insureds claimed that SFNB's

President had, by dishonest design, steered SFNB into a
substantial number of loans which later defaulted, which the
insureds contended caused SFNB to fail and, in turn, caused
them to lose their money on deposit.

Because SFNB's failure

could not be attributed solely to dishonestly made loans, the
Court utilized a fact-finding procedure which distinguished
between losses on loans that resulted from the President's
dishonesty and losses on loans which did not result from
dishonest conduct.

647 F.2d at 936.

In the instant case the jury engaged in equivalent
fact-finding.

The jury was asked to decide whether Home's

losses, with respect to each of thirtv-six loans, resulted from
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Larry Glad's dishonest conduct.
1290-1293)•

(Special Verdict, R.

Despite Aetna's closing argument that Home's

losses were exclusively the result of its own mismanagement,
the jury found that losses on 34 of the 36 loans resulted
directly from Glad's dishonest acts.

By implication, the jury

found that losses on two of the loans resulted from a cause
independent of Glad's conduct.

There is no basis under the law

of insurance contracts for any other kind of apportionment,
particularly an apportionment between concurring causes.
C.

AETNA WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY ALLEGED ERROR.

Finally, Aetna has failed to demonstrate that it was
somehow prejudiced.

The instructions given were adequate and

accurately set forth the law.

The Jury Instructions that were

given on causation, nos. 22, 23, 25 and 26 (none of which Aetna
objected to), clearly permitted Aetna to argue its
"mismanagement as a sole, sufficient cause" theory.

As its

Brief suggests, Aetna spent days presenting expert witnesses
who, with the benefit of hindsight, second-guessed virtually
every act and decision made by every officer and employee of
Home Savings (except Larry Glad).

See testimony of D.

McEachren (R. 2922.4); E. Weis (R. 2904.64); J. Croft (R.
2923.110); T. Walker (R. 2923.24); Frank Stuart (R. 2915.81);
R. Westergard (R. 2910.18).

Aetna, in fact, argued its theory

to the jury in closing argument. (R. 2917.180-.191, .198-.206,
.225-.226) .
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Nonetheless, Aetna contends that the instructions
"confused" the jury.

(Aetna Brief, pp. 72, 71). To buttress

this speculative assertion, Aetna points to certain juror
17
affidavits which it prepared.
The Trial Court ordered
these Affidavits stricken.

(Order, R. 2434-2438).

should not be given any consideration on appeal.
Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Utah App. 1988).

Thus, they
Belden v.

Even so, the

issue is not whether the jury was confused, but rather the
source of the confusion.
Many factors extrinsic to the propriety of instructions can
account for confusion.

Only confusion resulting from

prejudicial Trial Court error should be corrected.
was no such error.

Here, there

In light of the substantial evidence

supporting the jury's verdict in favor of Home Savings, which
Aetna does not challenge,18 Aetna's request for retrial
should be denied.

17

Paradoxically, Aetna solicited these affidavits after it
had argued that procurement and use of juror affidavits after
trial for any purpose was manifestly improper. (R.
1740-1748). Home had earlier submitted the jury foreman's
affidavit (R. 1731) to explain the jury's answers to special
interrogatories nos. 2 and 4. However, it was stricken along
with those Aetna submitted.

1B

Aetna devotes eight full pages of its Brief (p. 62-70)
selectively summarizing the evidence it believes supported its
alternative cause theory of mismanagement. The implication is
that the evidence supported a verdict other than that which the
jury rendered. Yet Aetna obviously has made no effort
whatsoever to marshall any of the substantial evidence
supporting the jury's verdict. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d
766, 769 (Utah 1985).
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
EITHER DISMISS HOME§S COMPLAINT OR REQUIRE JOINDER OF F&D
OF MARYLAND.
Prior to trial, Aetna moved to dismiss Home Savings'
Complaint on the ground that Home had failed to join an
indispensable party.

By a detailed three page minute entry

dated May 29, 1987, the Trial Court found that Home's prior
blanket bond insurer, F&D of Maryland, was not an indispensable
party to this action.

(Minute Entry, R. 143-145).

Included

among the Trial Court's specific findings, set forth in seven
separately numbered paragraphs, were: (1) complete relief could
be accorded those already parties, even in the abscmce of F&D;
(2) F&D need not be present as a party in order for the court
to determine whether Aetna's coverage, if any, was primary or
excess; (3) disposition of the action in F&D's absence would
not impair or impede F&D's ability to protect itself; (4)
liability in the case was not shared between Aetna and F&D; (5)
Aetna was not subject to a risk of incurring double or multiple
obligations by reason of F&D's absence; (6) judicial economy
was not a factor; (7) within reason a plaintiff is entitled to
proceed against the parties it chooses, which in this case did
not include F&D; (8) there was a risk that joinder of F&D might
result in removal to federal court, upsetting the choice of
forum by the parties to the litigation; and (9) that there was
no prejudice to Aetna in denying the motion.
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(R. 163-165).

Generally, a trial court's findings and conclusions are
presumed to be correct. Kohler v. Gardner City, 639 P.2d 162
(Utah 1981).

Moreover/ a trial court's determination/ properly

entered under Rule 19, will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944

(Utah App. 1989).

Here, Judge Murphy, after reviewing the

memoranda of the parties and hearing oral argument/ carefully
considered and entered his reasons for denying Aetna's motion,
consistent with requirements recently laid down in Seftel,
supra.
The primary issue in this litigation is whether the losses
Home sustained as a result of Larry Glad's dishonest conduct
are covered by Aetna's Bond. 19 Aetna's assertion that some
other person or entity is a necessary party for determination
of that issue is inherently incredible.

Its argument

apparently is that/ absent the presence of F&D as a party/
neither the Trial Court nor this Court is able to read and

19

In its effort to convince this Court that F&D was the one
obligated to indemnify Home/ Aetna subtly rewords Rider No. 618
(ir 4) to the F&D Bond (R. 3431)/ when it asserts that F&D,
after termination of its bond, would be liable for "only those
insurable events 'discovered before the time such termination
. . . becomes effective'" Aetna Brief/ p. 76-77 (emphasis
added). Aetna has substituted the words "insurable events" for
"loss sustained." Home/ on termination of the F&D Bond# had no
"loss sustained" which it could have "discovered" under the
terms of F&D's Bond.
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interpret the written agreement between Aetna and Home
Savings.

To the extent reference to the F&D Bond may have been

necessary, a copy was before the Court.

Adding F&D as a party,

however, would not have helped resolve the question of whether
or to what extent Aetna's Bond provides coverage.
In sharp contrast to Judge Murphy's detailed findings,
Aetna, in asserting error, fails to articulate any specific
reason as to why F&D must be a party to this action, other than
perhaps to share with it liability for Home's losses. 20
Indeed, Aetna's only authority, Continental Insurance Co. v.
Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner, Inc., 148 Cal.Rptr. 57
(Cal. App. 1978), is on the topic of Aetna sharing liability
for defense costs.

Morgan, Olmstead, however, had nothing to

do with who or what are indispensable parties to an action.

In

that case, the insured sought recovery of defense costs
incurred in defending a claim, the defense of which arguably
was within the terms of either of two bonds.

20

The insured chose

Even on this argument, Aetna's position is contradictory
and inconsistent. At several points, Aetna asserts that F&D
was an indispensable party because, had F&D been a party, it
could have "shared" liability. Aetna Brief, pp. 76, 78. Yet,
at page 77 of its Brief, Aetna states, "it was these contrary
positions which required joinder of F&D as a party, as well as
the fact the bv the express terms of the bonds only one or the
other but not both of the insurers could be liable for the
losses." (Emphasis added).
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to make the claim against both carriers.

Accordingly, there

was no issue regarding indispensability of a non-party.
The purpose of Rule 19 is to guard against the entry of
judgments that might prejudice the rights of non-parties in
their absence.

Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v.

Price River Water Users Association, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah
1982).

Home's lawsuit, by naming only Aetna, could not

prejudice F&D's rights.

If Home picked the wrong insurer to

sue, it was the one who stood to lose.

Indeed, as the Trial

Court explained, Home was the only party who could possibly
suffer prejudice by F&D's nonjoinder.

(R. 143, 144).

Finally, had Aetna, based on its mistaken interpretation of
coverage under its Bond, wanted F&D in the action to share
liability, it could have attempted to bring F&D in as a
third-party defendant under Utah R. Civ. P. 14(a).
not do so.

But it did

In short, neither Aetna nor F&D was prejudiced by

the Court's denial of Aetna's motion to dismiss.
ruling should be affirmed.
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The Court's

POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED AETNA'S
BELATED REQUEST TO "OFFSET- HOME SAVINGSJUDGMENT.
Aetna contends the "trial court should have reduced the
losses on the principal of the AFCO investor loans by
$237,760.77 in calculating its judgment,M

(Aetna Brief, Point

VII, p. 82). Aetna's contention is based on an erroneous and
unsupportable assumption that certain sums received by Home
Savings factually offset its losses.

In appealing this issue,

however, Aetna wholly ignores the Court's rationale for
rejecting it in the first place: that Aetna's argument required
that the Court usurp the jury's role and act as a fact-finder.
Aetna first offered up its "offset" theory well after
trial, and then only after the Trial Court ruled that Judgment
would be entered in Home's favor.

(Memorandum Decision, R.

2058; reserving ruling on the amount of the judgment to be
entered).
jury.

Aetna never presented its "offset" argument to the

The parties, in the Pretrial Order, did not reserve this

issue for determination by the Court after trial.
Order, R. 719, 734-5).

(Pretrial

Home objected to Aetna's untimely

submission of this claim and disputed the factual premise
underlying Aetna's unfounded assertions and the invidious
connotation that Aetna ascribed to Home's conduct. (R. 2103,
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2126-7, R. 2282, 2283-2290; R. 3278.51-.60).21

Rejecting

Aetna's belated argument, the Trial Court held:
In order to allow the reductions the court
would have to become a fact finder.
Defendant itself has indicated at least four
factual predicates to the proposed
reduction. (April 8, 1988, Memorandum
Regarding Attorney's Fees, and Calculation
of Damages, pp. 7-8). While there may be
evidence supporting such alleged facts,
there has been no fact finding and plaintiff
did not waive its right to a jury trial on
these factual questions.
(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2398)(emphasis added).

The Court

correctly held that Home Savings had a right to have the
factual issue of "offset" submitted to a jury.

UTAH CONST.

Art. 1, Sec. 10; Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-2 (1987)(as enacted
1951); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor
and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1981).
Consequently, it properly refused to consider Aetna's belated
plea, where Aetna had neglected to put the issue before the
jury.

For the same reason, this Court should decline to

consider Aetna's factually intensive appeal.

Franklin

Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045
(Utah 1983).

21

Home strenuously disputes Aetna's factual assertions and
its characterization of the $237,760.77 as a "benefit."
Rather, the $237,760.77 which Home received was applied to
satisfy obligations which, had they not been satisfied, would
have resulted in additional loss. R. 2282-2290; R.
3278.51-.54.
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POINT VIII.
THE JUDGMENT PROPERLY INCLUDES $190,647.31
IN ATTORNEYS FEES THAT HOME SAVINGS PAID TO
THE ARMITAGE PLAINTIFFS.
The parties, following trial, submitted to the Court the
issue of Home Savings' claim for attorneys fees paid to the
Armitage plaintiffs,

(R. 2217, 2226-2230, 2291-2299).

Dissatisfied with Judge Murphy's ruling (Minute Entry, R.
2397-2402), Aetna asks this Court to excise $190,647.31 from
the Judgment.

(Judgment, R. 2854).

Home sustained a loss of $190,647.31 as a consequence of
Judge Kane's Order awarding $381,294.62 in attorneys fees to
the plaintiffs in the Armitaae litigation.
Attorneys Fees (R. 2800-2818).

Order Awarding

Kane based the award on the

Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) and,
alternatively, on the Utah Securities Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-22(6)(1953). Home appealed the Armitage judgment.
Thereafter, the Armitage plaintiffs agreed to accept half the
attorneys fees they had been awarded, i.e., $190,647.31.

It

was this sum that Home paid.
Judge Murphy, having considered the very same arguments
Aetna now advances (R. 2214, 2226-2230), found that Home's
loss, in the sum of $190,647.31, resulted from Larry Glad's
dishonest conduct and held it was covered by Aetna's Bond.
(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2399).

Aetna now asks this Court to

substitute its view of the facts for Judge Murphy's.
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Aetna, in

Point VIII-A of its Brief, argues, in inverse order: (1) that
Elaine Reese, not Larry Glad, caused the loss; (2) that its
Bond covers only malum in se offenses; and (3) that the trading
exclusion, Rider 6030a, excludes coverage.
A.

AETNA IGNORES EVIDENCE THAT TIES THE $190,647.31 LOSS
TO LARRY GLAD.

Aetna asserts that this loss Mwas caused by Home Savings*
loan officer, Elaine Reese," and concludes that, "thus, any
violation of the truth-in-lending statute was not a loss caused
by the conduct of Larry Glad."

(Brief, p. 85; R. 2214, 2229).

To this, the Trial Court stated simply, "defendant's argument
disregards the evidence of Glad's dishonest participation in
the back-dating of loan documents."

(Minute Entry, R. 2397,

2399) .
Findings of fact by a Court shall not be set aside "unless
clearly erroneous."

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

In this instance,

ample evidence exists in the record to support the Trial
Court's finding.
documents.

It is true that Elaine Reese backdated loan

Aetna, however, conveniently overlooks Reese's

testimony that she backdated loan documents a£ Larry Glad's
direction:
The next time I typed up documents again, I
typed it with this correct date, and Larry
Glad came in and instructed me that their
agreement was that all the documents were to
be backdated, not iust that one. And I did
not confirm that with Bill Cox. I assumed
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i t was t h a t way.
17).

(R. 2 9 1 3 . 1 1 2 , l i n e s 13 -

* * * * *

He [Gladl said I had misunderstood and that
the intention was that all of them were to
be backdated. (R. 2913.113, lines 7 - 8 ) .
* * * * *

Like I said, I did not verify that with
Bill. I iust took Larry's word for it and
proceeded that way. (R. 2913.113, lines 10
- 12).
B.

THE AETNA BOND DOES NOT LIMIT COVERAGE TO "MALUM IN
SE" OFFENSES.

Aetna, at pages 84-85 of its Brief, makes the incredible
statement that its Bond covers only "malum in se" conduct.
Aetna's argument, apparently, is that inasmuch as civil
liability can be imposed under 15 U.S.C. § 1631 g£ seq. absent
any finding of Hevil intent," then such civil liability
necessarily could not produce a loss covered under the Aetna
Bond.

However, the common law classification of criminal

offenses is not incorporated into the Aetna Bond.

The criminal

law malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction simply has nothing
to do with whether a loss sustained by an insured is covered
under the Bond.

Contrary to Aetna's assertion, an employee's

conduct need not be criminal to constitute "dishonesty" as
defined by the Bond.

Midland Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity &

Deposit Co. of Maryland, 442 F.Supp. 960, 971 (D.N.J. 1977);
Boston Securities v. United Bonding Co.. 309 F.Supp. 1270, 1271
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(E.D. Mo. 1970), affirmed 441 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1971).
Rather, the test is whether loss results directly from the
dishonest or fraudulent act of an employee.
Rider 6041.

See Aetna Bond,

The pervasive nature of Glad's dishonesty,

including his instruction to Reese to backdate loans, supports
the Trial Court's ruling that the loss Home sustained was
covered by Aetna's Bond.
C.

THE TRADING EXCLUSION RIDER DOES NOT AVOID AETNA'S
OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY HOME SAVINGS.

For the reasons set forth in Point IV, supra, Aetna cannot
use the trading exclusion rider to avoid coverage.
Furthermore, because Judge Kane premised his award of attorneys
fees on the federal Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(3), as well as on Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(1)(b), a
separate basis existed for the award of fees completely apart
from any "securities" statute.

(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2399).
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POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT, PURSUANT TO STIPULATION OF
THE PARTIES, PROPERLY AWARDED HOME SAVINGS
ITS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN
DEFENDING IN THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION.
In accordance with a Stipulation entered into by the
parties (R. 2850-2853), the Trial Court included in the
Judgment $437,500 as reasonable attorneys fees and costs
incurred and paid by Home Savings in defending itself in the
Armitage litigation.

(Judgment, R. 2854-2857).

Aetna asks

this Court to delete these fees from the Judgment or,
alternatively, to direct the Trial Court to slash the award to
$62,500.00.

Appellant's Brief, p. 88.

In making this request,

Aetna seeks to circumvent the very Stipulation it voluntarily
entered into after being unable or unwilling to controvert the
evidence and law regarding attorneys fees which Home submitted.
The Trial Court awarded Home Savings $437,500 under
Agreement C of the Aetna Bond.

Agreement C provides that Aetna:

. . . will indemnify the Insured against
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred and paid by the Insured in
defending any suit or legal proceeding
brought against the Insured to enforce the
Insured's liability or alleged liability on
account of any loss, claim or damage which,
if established against the Insured, would
constitute a valid and collectible loss
sustained by the Insured under the terms of
the Bond. * * *
Going into trial, both parties understood that Home's
entitlement to attorneys fees under Agreement C hinged on
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whether the jury would find that Home's primary losses, caused
by avoidance of the AFCO-investor trust deeds, resulted from
the dishonesty of Larry Glad; i.e., whether the underlying
losses constituted Ma valid and collectible loss sustained by
the Insured under the terms of the Bond."

Both parties

consequently agreed, should the jury find the underlying losses
to have been caused by Glad's dishonest conduct, then the issue
of Home's claim for reasonable attorneys fees under Agreement C
would be determined by the Trial Court.

(Stipulated Pretrial

Order, R. 719, 734-5).
Following the Trial Court's post-trial decision that
Judgment would be entered in Home's favor (Memorandum Decision,
R. 2058 - 2081), Aetna argued for the first time that Home
could recover only the attorneys fees expended in defending
against "covered" claims.

(R. 2214, 2230-2233).

Aetna baldly

asserted that this amount would equal 1/7 of the attorneys fees
expended by Home in defending the Armitaoe lawsuit, reasoning
that of the seven bases on which Home was found liable, only
"fraud" is covered under its Bond.

(See R. 2214, 2230-2234).

Judge Murphy rejected Aetna's "arbitrary one-seventh
allocation theory," as he termed it, because: (1) it
incorrectly assumes that only loss caused by "fraud" is covered
by the Aetna Bond; (2) it incorrectly assumes that each claim
required an equal expenditure of time and costs; and (3) it
incorrectly assumes that any particular expenditure of time and
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costs benefitted only one claim, and that claims defended in
Armitaae were unrelated, independent and without overlap.
(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 3000).

See also Judge Kane's Order

Awarding Attorneys Fees (holding, in connection with the
Armitaae plaintiffs* application for attorneys fees, that, "In
the Home Savings Litigation, the work on unsuccessful claims
generally is not separable from work on successful claims.")
(R. 2800, 2804).

Aetna's argument also is factually incorrect

because Home actually defended against 20 claims, not the seven
Aetna assumes.

(Order, R. 2800, 2801, 2816).

Furthermore,

Aetna advanced its one-seventh apportionment argument in an
evidentiary vacuum:

the records of fees paid by Home in the

Armitaae litigation and the attorneys' time records were not
then before the Court.

(See Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2399-2401).

Although the Trial Court rejected Aetna's one-seventh
argument, it reserved ruling finally on fees claimed under
Agreement C, including the issue of apportionment, and directed
the parties to resubmit the issue once a record was developed.
(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2399-2401).

Thereafter, Home moved for

partial summary judgment and scheduled hearings on the issue of
attorneys fees under Agreement C.
2823-2827).

(R. 3279-3280, 2439-2441,

Home claimed that Agreement C entitled it to

$474,170.57 (R. 2653, 2666), based on affidavits, attorneys
time records, and other supporting documents filed in support
of its motion (R. 2442-2652, 2686-2822, 3282-3365).
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Most

importantly, Home briefed, in detail, the legal argument on
apportionment, and demonstrated that apportionment would not be
proper on the basis of the evidentiary record now before the
Court.

(R. 2653, 2673-2684).

In response, Aetna neither addressed the evidentiary record
nor briefed the issue of apportionment.
counter-affidavits.

It did not file

Simply put, Aetna did not contest Home's

claim for $474,170.57 in fees.

Instead, Aetna stipulated that

Home's entitlement to fees under Agreement C would be $437,500,
provided the Appeals Court upheld the Trial Court's judgment
that the underlying losses were covered by the Bond.

Aetna, by

its Stipulation "waiverdl all arguments, claims and issues on
appeal that relate to the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees
and court costs under General Agreement C of the Aetna Bond."
(Stipulation, R. 2850-2853).

Having presented no evidence to

contradict Home's claim, having not objected when evidence of
reasonableness of fees was placed before the Court, and having
stipulated that the "reasonable" amount of Home's fees was
$437,500, Aetna has not preserved for review by this Court the
issue of "apportionment of fees."

See McCorkle v. Great

Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 586 (Okl. 1981).

Aetna should

not be permitted to renounce its Stipulation and, contrary to
its agreement, resurrect its primitive "one-seventh
apportionment argument" which the Court rejected.
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Home's losses, sustained when Judge Kane avoided the
Armitaqe plaintiffs' notes and trust deeds, are "valid and
collectible losses" under the Bond.

Consequently, Home is

entitled to recover the $437,500 which Aetna stipulated were
the "reasonable" fees Home incurred and paid in defending the
Armitaqe lawsuit.
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CONCLUSION
No basis exists for either reversing or modifying the Trial
Court's judgment or for remanding this case for another lengthy
trial.
Accordingly, Home respectfully requests that the Judgment,
Orders and Rulings of the Trial Court be affirmed in their
entirety.
DATED this

^"^

day of May, 1990.
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